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THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
David S. Loukt
Although a maxim of statutory drafting is to identify the
relevant audience and draft so that he audience can "get the
message," conventional theories of statutory interpretation
often overlook important considerations about how statutes
communicate and delegate to a diverse range of intended
audiences. Statutes exist to change the conduct and behavior
of many kinds of intended audiences, including administra-
tive agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement
officers, corporations, interest groups, lawyers, and laypeople.
Influenced by lessons from the philosophies of law and lan-
guage, this Article contends that Judicial statutory interpreta-
tion serves an important yet underappreciated role in
providing a legal grammar for how other legal audiences are
expected by law to understand, implement, and conform their
conduct to the law. If so, then prevailing judicial methods of
interpretation may not be equally suitable for all statutory
audiences. 'This is because diverse audiences have distinct
roles, interests, and capabilities, and statutes communicate
to, and alter the conduct of, relevant audiences in very differ-
ent ways. Some statutes set out specific rules that apply di-
rectly to the conduct of lay audiences, others conscript
qualfied third parties to transmit legal knowledge to affected
members of the public, and others furnish open-ended man-
dates for governmental audiences to implement through sub-
sequent regulation and enforcement. Yet dominant
interpretive theories like textualism and purposivism often
seem to treat Judges as the chief audience for statutes, and
therefore call for the same methods of interpretation regard-
less of the statute or its intended audience(s).
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This Article argues that considerations of statutory audi-
ence and canons and methods of interpretation are necessa-
rily linked, and it offers the first extensive account of the
relationship between judicial statutory interpretation method-
ology and statutory audience. This ambit is both descriptive
and normative. Descriptively, this Article identifies the subtle
ways in which courts already implicitly, If inconsistently,
seem influenced by statutory audience considerations. Courts
invoke substantive canons of interpretation that can be under-
stood in part as audience canons: the rule of lenity (for laype-
ople), interpretive deference (for administrative agencies),
clear notice rules (for states as Spending Clause counterpar-
ties), and mistake-of-law defenses (for deficient taxpayers but
not criminal defendants). These substantive judicial doctrines
recognize that statutes communicate to, and alter the behavior
of different audiences in distinctive ways. Yet when it comes
to choices of interpretive methods, courts often employ one-
size-fits-all approaches to interpretation, drawing (or not
drawing) on the same preferred semantic and syntactic ca-
nons of construction, evidence of linguistic usage, and other
sources of statutory meaning regardless of the statute or its
audience(s). Courts do so even when this approach may un-
dermine both the normative goals that motivate audience-ori-
ented substantive doctrines as well as the efficacy of the
statutory scheme itself
Normatively, this Article contends that many disagree-
ments in statutory interpretation may be attributed to conflicts
in prioritizing competing statutory audiences, because many
statutes are directed at multiple and distinct audiences. To
demonstrate this, this Article revisits prominent statutory in-
terpretation cases in financial fraud, environmental, and civil
rights law from the standpoint of statutory audience. Viewed
through this lens, canonical statutory interpretation debates
that typically register as disputes about method can also be
understood as disagreements about audience. Indeed, Judi-
cial opinions often seem written with distinct (and conflicting)
statutory audiences in mind. This Article concludes that ex-
plicitly addressing audience considerations in interpretation
can highlight the important normative stakes of statutory in-
terpretation theory; enhance the efficacy of statutes; offer les-
sons for legislative and regulatory drafting; and may even
provide a way forward beyond debates between textualism
and purposivism.
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"IDENTIFY THE AUDIENCE.-Decide who is supposed to
get the message."' So instructs the U.S. House of Representa-
tives' legislative drafting manual. This advice is common to
many statutory drafting guides, which emphasize that a stat-
ute's audience should influence a statute's structure, style,
and terminology.2 Different audiences have varied levels of le-
gal fluency and background knowledge, and distinct audiences
have very different modes of interacting with a given statutory
scheme.3 It would be foolish to draft a playground ordinance in
the same manner as a multinational corporate tax provision.4
For statutory drafting, at least, audience considerations appear
to be a central concern.
When it comes to the interpretation of statutes, however,
important considerations of audience often go overlooked in
statutory interpretation debates. In using the term "audience,"
I mean to focus on the range of legal actors whose behavior may
be altered as a result of a statutory enactment. These include
audiences that are actively engaged in understanding statutory
meaning, as well as those passively affected by statutory rules,
and also include the many third parties whom the law con-
scripts to transmit legal knowledge to the affected audience(s).5
1 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 104TH
CONG., HLC No. 104-1, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 5
(1995).
2 See F. Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting, in THE REGULATORY STATE 157,
159 (Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward L. Rubin & Kevin M. Stack eds., 2010)
("[Tihe legislative draftsman will do well to consider the persons to whom the law
is primarily addressed," which will "bear on style and terminology" to ensure that
"the writing [is] directed at the level of understanding shared by the bulk of that
group.").
3 See id. at 159-60; Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation,
Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 1529, 1534 (2018) (finding that
for statutes that rely primarily on courts and civil litigation for statutory enforce-
ment, Congress provides greater substantive policy specificity in the statute itself
as compared to statutes that direct enforcement to agencies, because courts have
less capable policy-making infrastructures than agencies have).
4 See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in
Statutory Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOwA L. REV.
1291, 1295 (2019) (finding that most staffers involved in drafting the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017 viewed the audiences of the Code as experts such as the
Treasury, professional preparers, and tax preparation software companies, rather
than ordinary taxpayers-and drafted accordingly).
5 One reason I use the term "audience" is to acknowledge that although a
statute may formally address one audience (say, corporate executives), other
audiences may be just as involved in constructing its meaning and implementa-
tion (say, corporate counsel and outside auditors). Moreover, one statutory audi-
ence may mediate the interpretations of others: a citizen, for example, could look
up the statutory text herself, and consult her accountant, and call the IRS
140 [Vol. 105:137
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Not all statutes communicate to their respective audiences in
the same manner: some statutes establish specific rules that
regulate the conduct of lay audiences like the general public,
while other statutes set out broad mandates to specialized gov-
ernment audiences, who implement them through subsequent
regulation and enforcement.6
Despite these differences, when it comes to methods of in-
terpretation (i.e., semantic and syntactic canons of construc-
tion, evidence of linguistic usage, and extratextual sources of
statutory meaning), judges often treat all statutes, and all stat-
utory audiences, homogeneously. They deploy the same tools
and rules of interpretation to decipher a firearms carriage rule
with direct application to the general public as they do to de-
code technical statutory language directing federal agencies to
implement the Affordable Care Act.7
Judges sometimes express broad concerns about statutory
ambiguity and fair notice, and emphasize the importance of
consistency and predictability yet they generally tend not to
inquire about whether a statute is too ambiguous or provides
too little notice for its intended audience, nor whether the selec-
helpline for guidance, each of whom may have different understandings of what
the law requires. And as any taxpayer who has prevailed against the IRS can
attest, the agency is not always right about the meaning of the statute. Others
writing in the philosophy of law have also used the term, although often more
narrowly with respect only to those directly addressed by the law. E.g., ANDREI
MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw 28 (2014); BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A
THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 71 (2016);
Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
231, 242 (2011). By contrast, the concept of statutory audience can also be
conceived of as those who are not specifically regulated by a given statute, but
rather are members of the public at large, who want to ensure that social
problems are adequately addressed through legislation. See Victoria Nourse, Mis-
understanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty,
and Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1142 (2011) (noting that when
Congress enacts legislation, it is speaking to multiple audiences, "to the people as
well as the courts").
6 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Sepa-
ration in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 625 (1984) (discussing the distinc-
tion between conduct rules addressed to the general public and decision rules
addressed to officials).
7 Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (majority and
dissent employing, among other methods and canons: consistent usage presump-
tion, dictionary definitions, legislative history, legislative intent, ordinary mean-
ing, plain meaning, rule against superfluity, statutory context, statutory purpose,
statutory scheme/structure, whole act, whole code, and the legal significance of
semantic ambiguity), with King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (majority and
dissent employing, among other methods and canons: dictionary definitions, leg-
islative history, legislative intent, ordinary meaning, plain meaning, rule against
superfluity, statutory context, statutory purpose, statutory scheme/structure,
whole act, whole code, and the legal significance of semantic ambiguity).
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tive and inconsistent application of interpretive methods raises
rule-of-law or integrity-of-statute concerns. Too often, a draft-
ers' imperative-to identify the audience(s) and provide an ef-
fective statutory scheme for the audience(s) to follow and
implement-is lost in the judicial interpretive enterprise.
Whether prevailing judicial approaches to interpretation fur-
ther the legislative prerogative to ensure statutory audiences
"get[ ] the message"" is often overlooked. Rarely is it asked
whether these approaches provide predictable and useful sig-
nals for subsequent statutory audiences involved in legal rule
transmission, implementation, and compliance.9
From a rule-of-law perspective, the frequent disconnect be-
tween questions of statutory audience uptake and questions of
interpretive method is puzzling.10 Most jurisprudential theo-
8 Indeed, recent empirical scholarship suggests that many prevailing judicial
methods of interpretation are neither shared by, nor known to, legislative drafters.
See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part H, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
9 E.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 97 (2005) (canvassing the
use of canons in hundreds of Supreme Court decisions and concluding that the
Justices' use of canons is so "case-specific and Justice-specific" that "reliance on
the canons may be justified as situationally enlightening without in any meaning-
ful sense promoting a more systematic predictability or consistency").
10 While the core theories of textualism and purposivism are less attentive to
audience concerns, a number of scholars have assessed unique interpretive per-
spectives of first-order interpreters such as prosecutors (see, e.g., Dan M. Kahan,
Is Chevron Relevant o Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469, 479 (1996)
(arguing that federal prosecutors currently have a "significant share of delegated
lawmaking authority"); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes,
1994 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 406 [hereinafter Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law
Crimes] (arguing that consistently applying the rule of lenity would minimize
prosecutorial abuse of discretion)) or federal administrative agencies (see, e.g.,
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 504 (2005)
(arguing that "Iflully legitimate judicial interpretation will conflict with fully legiti-
mate agency interpretation"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 807, 809 (2002)
(arguing for unique meta-rules for the interpretation of statutes directed at agen-
cies); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibil-
ity to Read Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 321, 321 (1990) (discussing how administrative agencies, instead of
judges, frequently act as the interpreters of statutes); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpret-
ing Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 477 (1989) (discussing
the deference that courts give to administrative agencies' interpretations of stat-
utes); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999, 1018 (2015) (examining how administrative agencies interpret stat-
utes)). Other scholars have examined portions of this question over the years.
See, e.g., William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statu-
142
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ries of law understand the law as a means of implementing
societal plans and coordinating social behavior." For a statute
to achieve such aims, its meaning and effect must be commu-
nicated or transmitted to its relevant audience(s), and for this
to be successful, the relevant statutory audience(s)-or others
acting on their behalf-must be able to ascertain the statute's
meaning and translate its plan into action.1 2 (Indeed, a funda-
mental tenet of almost any account of the rule of law is that the
law must be sufficiently accessible, intelligible, and predictable
for those governed by it. 13) In this Article, I will call these
tory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 630 (2001) (observing different methods
of interpretation for statutes regulating interpretive communities in labor law as
compared to administrative law); Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress
Really Works?, 66 DuKE L.J. 979, 1040 (2017) (pressing for a "conversation model
of interpretation" that considers the contexts in which interpreters encounter
legislative text); Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 105, 139 (2003) (arguing the law is addressed to the state and its
actors, not to the citizens in general nor the segment of the population to whom a
text refers).
11 See, e.g., Scotr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 394 (2011) (describing the "basic activ-
ity of law" as social planning); Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at
the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 183-85 (1982) (describing how
judges can use the "coordination theory" to determine how parties should have
acted in a certain situation). Legal philosopher Lon Fuller once argued that law
functions both as an instrument of social control and as a means to facilitate
human interaction. See Lon L. Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and
Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 BYU L. REV. 89, 89. See gener-
ally infra subpart I.B.
12 Some might question whether most applications of a statute entail the act
of interpretation. I share Justice Antonin Scalia's and lexicographer Bryan Gar-
ner's view that "[elvery application of a text to particular circumstances entails
interpretation." ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012). Other scholars of legal interpretation, such as
Stanley Fish, have relatedly argued that there can be no such thing as a literal
"meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can serve as a constraint on
interpretation." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC,
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 4 (1989). But see
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COM-
MENT. 95 (2010) (arguing that most applications of statutory text are acts of con-
struction-the process of giving a text legal effect-rather than acts of the
interpretation of the meaning of the semantic content of the text).
13 See, e.g., TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAw 37 (2011) ("The law must be
accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable."); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994) ("If it were not possible to communicate
general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could understand,
without further direction, ... nothing that we now recognize as law could exist.");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1997) (noting that nearly all modem accounts of the rule of
law emphasize the capacity for legal rules to effectively and stably guide conduct).
Other leading Anglo-American legal philosophers, including Lon Fuller, and, more
recently, Scott Shapiro, have made similar claims. See generally infra subpart I.B
(discussing the need for statutory audiences to be able to develop meaning from
statutes without resort to judicial adjudication).
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individuals and statutes are enacted to alter institutions the
statute's "first-order" audiences, because their behavior is
what statutes are enacted to alter, and they give meaning to
statutes through practice and implementation.14 If statutory
provisions are understood as legislative plans, then they are
almost always inherently incomplete or ambiguous ones, so
first-order interpretive practices are essential for putting legis-
lative plans into action.15
Awareness of judicial rules of interpretation will necessa-
rily be essential to the successful implementation of statutes by
their first-order audiences. This is because judicial interpre-
tive rules will ultimately determine which legal meanings at-
tributed to statutes by first-order audiences will be deemed
legally correct. In this sense, courts often function as "second-
order" interpreters: they establish rules for interpretation that,
when superimposed on the underspecified statutory text, pro-
vide a kind of legal grammar for understanding how to derive
specific legal meaning from ambiguous text. When judges de-
termine statutory meaning by applying a particular canon,
source, or method, they narrow the statute's range of possible
applications by selecting one meaning from several-or some-
times many-plausible interpretations of an often underspeci-
fied and ambiguous statutory text.16 As second-order
interpreters, courts guide first-order statutory audiences in de-
termining which potential semantic meaning is legally "cor-
rect," and judicial rules of interpretation therefore signal to
relevant audiences how similar statutory ambiguities should
be resolved in future cases.
A focus on statutory audiences raises other critical consid-
erations: if statutes have distinctive audiences, and communi-
cate to those audiences in different ways, when and how
should statutes drafted for one audience be interpreted differ-
ently from statutes drafted for another? For example, as many
administrative law scholars have long argued, agency officials
preparing a proposed rule for notice and comment will very
likely turn first to a statute's legislative history, which often
contains more specific instructions from Congress to the
14 Or, in the case of the statute's implementers, like administrative agencies,
to alter the behavior of others.
15 See infra subpart I.B.
16 William Baude and Stephen Sachs have helpfully described this as "the law
of interpretation," which creates a legal structure that enables the exercise of
legislative authority through legal enactments. See William Baude & Stephen E.
Sachs, The Law ofInterpretatior, 130 HARV. L. REv. 1079, 1097-99 (2017).
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agency than exists in the statute itself.17 Given the technical
nature of many statutory provisions addressed primarily to
agencies regulating sophisticated entities, the notion that these
statutes will (or should) always transmit instruction only in a
narrow band of "ordinary" or "plain" semantic meanings might
seem somewhat odd.
However, the expectation of "plain" legal meaning may be
more appropriate for statutes addressed to lay audiences and
specify conduct rules that apply directly.1 3 A cyclist hoping to
ride through a park that prohibits vehicles will almost certainly
not think (or know) to consult arcane extratextual legislative
history or conduct whole code analysis to determine if their
cycling flouts a sign's prohibition on vehicles in the park. In
that circumstance, the "plain text" of an ordinance replicated
on a park sign may be all that is appropriate to expect the
affected audience to consider. Between these extremes, stat-
utes in areas such as environmental, civil rights, and tax law
also communicate to their relevant audiences in distinctive
ways, and alter their behavior through distinctive mechanisms.
Each may warrant particular approaches to interpretation, es-
pecially because many statutory schemes conscript or deploy
qualified third parties to transmit legal knowledge and assist in
legal compliance.
This Article reorients statutory interpretation theory in
terms of statutory audience, constructing a framework for situ-
ating and embedding questions of audience within a theory of
statutory interpretation. Refraining the task of statutory inter-
pretation in terms of statutory audience reveals several impor-
tant and yet underexamined considerations for the field.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the es-
sential role that statutory audiences play in implementing and
interpreting statutes by drawing on concepts from both the
philosophy of law and language. I identify the essential role
17 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 10, at 510-12 (arguing that in the legislative
history Congress often provides agencies with more specific instructions than in
the text of the statute itself); Strauss, supra note 10, at 346-47 (arguing that
agencies are much closer to the legislative process than are courts and that
legislative history materials enhance agencies' capacities to fulfill enacting Con-
gress's legislative aims).
18 And, as I will argue, even if statutes are rarely expected to put members of
the public directly on notice, the fact that statutory prohibitions sometimes do is
reason enough that a preliminary inquiry about statutory audience should always
be an initial step in the interpretive enterprise.
2019] 145
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that judicial statutory interpretation serves to help clarify how
statutory audiences should effectuate statutory plans, and I
explain why statutes directed at different audiences will neces-
sarily alter behavior in different ways.
Part II then sets out a typology of the very different kinds of
statutory audiences and statutory interpreters, including ordi-
nary audiences (laypeople and the general public); influential
intermediary audiences (such as industry experts, lawyers, ad-
vocacy groups, and others who help laypeople comply with the
law, as well as low-level government officers like law enforce-
ment officers), and official audiences (such as administrative
agencies, whose interpretations often carry the force of law in
the absence of judicial reversal). And, on occasion, evenjudges
can be the first-order audience, as with attorneys' fee-shifting
provisions that delegate discretionary action to courts alone.
An audience-focused examination of statutory interpreta-
tion theory in turn highlights the frequent disjuncture between
how courts deploy substantive canons (rules for the interpreta-
tion of statutory texts) and interpretive methods (semantic and
syntactic canons of construction, evidence of linguistic usage,
and other sources of statutory meaning) used to attribute
meaning to specific words or phrases in such texts.'9 Revisit-
ing canonical cases in criminal, tax, administrative, and civil
rights law, this Part examines how courts sometimes seem to
express awareness of distinctive statutory audience concerns.
Courts invoke substantive canons that are audience-oriented,
such as the rule of lenity (for lay audiences), the mistake-of-law
doctrine (for certain generalist audiences but not others), ad-
ministrative deference (for agency audiences), and clear notices
rules (for the states as Spending Clause counterparties).20 Yet
courts are often unreflective in their use of interpretive meth-
ods. Sometimes they draw on sources of "ordinary meaning"
19 Here, I adopt the distinction between substantive legal canons or rules,
which judges apply to text, and linguistic interpretive methods, canons, and
sources, which govern how judges determine the linguistic meaning of text. See
Baude & Sachs, supra note 16, at 1105-09. Others have employed a similar
typology. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT
& JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PUBLIC POLICY 319-36 (5th ed. 2014) (distinguishing between linguistic
canons and substantive canons); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9, at 12-14 (also
distinguishing between linguistic and substantive canons); Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 8, at 923-24 (distinguishing between "textual canons" and "'substan-
tive canons', which are policy-based presumptions, like the rule of lenity or Chev-
ron deference").
20 For a helpful recent review of the Roberts' Court's deployment of substan-
tive canons in statutory interpretation, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REv. 825 (2017).
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THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
unlikely to reflect real-world usage or to enhance the notice
function of statutory text. In other instances, they have selec-
tively imposed one particular "ordinary meaning" on a vague
and open-ended statutory decision-rule that seems to permit
an administrative agency to implement it in any of several per-
missible ways.
These observations are especially important because, as I
explain in Part III, many statutes have multiple and distinct
statutory audiences. Judicial choices about interpretive meth-
ods often seem to relate-albeit tacitly, and often inconsis-
tently-to which of several possible statutory audiences a given
judge has in mind. To demonstrate this, this Part revisits ca-
nonical statutory interpretation cases including Yates v. United
States,2 1 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon,22 and Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy.23 In those cases, I argue that debates
about substantive canons and interpretive methods in statu-
tory interpretation often seem to function as proxy wars for
unsurfaced (or unspoken) normative disagreements about stat-
utory audience. Arguments about whether to prioritize legisla-
tive history or evidence of ordinary usage can just as easily be
understood as disputes about whether to read statutes
through the lens of the administrative agency, the laypeople, a
sophisticated actor, or some other audience of the statute.
Recognizing that choices about interpretive methods will
not always be value-neutral also helps to clarify the normative
stakes in many important statutory interpretation disagree-
ments. This includes, first and formost which audience to pri-
oritize when interpreting a statute that sets out conflicting
priorities. This suggests that courts should be more explicit in
stating the assumptions about statutory audience that moti-
vate their use of various methods of interpretation. Criteria
might include the audiences to which the statute is primarily
addressed; whether the statute anticipates that the audience(s)
will rely on intermediaries to achieve compliance; and the man-
ner of the statutory communication. A statute may seek to
communicate to a broad audience in a specific conduct rule,
set out an intransitive decision rule to be implemented via ad-
ministrative agency, or delegate that legal knowledge be trans-
mitted via influential interpreters like accountants, legal
counsel, or compliance officers. Making considerations of stat-
21 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
22 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
23 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
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utory audience central to statutory interpretation would en-
hance the capacity for statutes to communicate effectively to
the relevant audience(s) and ensure that questions of statutory
ambiguity are resolved with greater efficacy and legitimacy.
Part IV concludes by briefly exploring the ramifications of a
statutory interpretation methodology that is audience-cen-
tered, both for judges and for statutory drafters. Attending to
questions of audience in statutory interpretation may also pro-
vide a path beyond the debates about textualism and purposiv-
ism that have often dominated (and sometimes exhausted) the
field in recent years.2 4 A theory of interpretation that assesses
questions of statutory audience and interpretive method to-
gether helps to reveal why (and when) each approach retains
merit, depending on the statute and its audience(s). Such a
methodology might also contribute toward a principled com-
promise between judges' apparent preference for pragmatic
freedom in interpretation2 5 and (at least some) judges' stated
aspirations for greater predictability and consistency.26
Emphasis on audience also helps to clarify recent debates
about the continued viability of administrative deference doc-
trines like Chevron deference2 7 and Auer/Kisor deference.2 8 If
ensuring adequate notice for regulated audiences is an essen-
24 See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of
Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 191 (2017) [hereinafter
Gluck, The Failure of Formalism] (arguing that those earlier "debates have taken
us as far as they can go").
25 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench- A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 131 HARv.
L. REV. 1298, 1324 (2018) (identifying pragmatism as an important theme in
federal appellate judges' statutory interpretation methodology and recognizing the
absence of legal doctrines that can guide interpretive pragmatism).
26 E.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2121 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) ("To
make judges more neutral and impartial in statutory interpretation cases, we
should carefully examine the interpretive rules of the road and try to settle as
many of them in advance as we can. Doing so would make the rules more predict-
able in application.").
27 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
28 Auer deference is named for the case that stands for it, Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997), in which the Court affirmed the practice ofjudicial deference
to administrative agencies in the interpretation of agencies' own ambiguous regu-
lations. Auer has been widely criticized from both the bench and the academy.
E.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("A legion of academics, lower court judges, and Members of this
Court-even Auer's author-has called on us to abandon Auer."); Christopher J.
Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 103 (2018) (reviewing arguments against Auer deference).
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tial inquiry for the judicial review of agency interpretations,
then identifying the relevant conduct rule for that regulated-
audience should be the central question. While a conduct rule
may sometimes be derived from the text of an administrative
statute, more commonly specific conduct rules for regulated
parties derive from administrative rules, regulations, and gui-
dance promulgated by the agency. In such circumstances,
skepticism of deference to the agency interpretation of the am-
biguous regulation, rather than the ambiguous statute, may be
more appropriate. And textual methods of interpretation seek-
ing a term's "ordinary meaning" may be likely to enhance
notice.
Finally, attention to statutory audience also provides sev-
eral lessons for statute drafting that can help to mitigate inter-
pretive confusion in the first place.
I
STATUTORY MEANING AND AUDIENCE
During his confirmation hearing to become Chief Justice,
John Roberts famously compared the job of a judge interpret-
ing a law to that of an umpire: "to call balls and strikes."29
While Chief Justice Roberts was both praised and scorned for
his analogy,3 0 less attention was given to his accompanying
remark: "Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire."3 1
Notwithstanding the future Chief Justice's observation, the
literature has long framed statutory interpretation problems as
problems primarily for judges-rather than the many other
audiences of statutes.
And just as nobody goes to the ball game to see the umpire,
no theory of statutory interpretation should exist only for
judges. Statutory interpretation theories tend to focus onjudg-
ing statutes-i.e., deciding on the proper role of courts vis-a-vis
legislatures. But any theory of interpretation should also ad-
dress how judicial rules of interpretation can hinder or en-
hance the capacity for law's other audiences to derive meaning
from, or conform behavior to, statutory provisions.
29 Confirnation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 56 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Norninee to be C.J. of the United States).
30 See Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 641 (2012).
31 Roberts Hearing, supra note 29, at 55 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Nominee to be C.J. of the United States).
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For both rule-of-law reasons and integrity-of-statutes rea-
sons, I argue in this Part that it is critical that there be suffi-
cient congruence between how judges derive meaning from
statutes and how the law's other audiences are expected to do
so. When viewed from the standpoint of non-judicial audi-
ences, it becomes clear how statutory texts seek to communi-
cate and alter behavior in very different ways for distinct
audiences. The question is then whether prevailing statutory
interpretation methodologies hould also be responsive to va-
ried audience considerations.
A. Judging Statutes
A common trope in discussions of statutory interpretation
theory is that American judges lack a principled method of
interpreting statutes, something legal theorists32 and members
of the judiciary3 3 alike have long recognized. Karl Llewellyn
famously (if somewhat facetiously) observed in 1950 that for
every canon, there is a countercanon, for every interpretive
thrust, a countervailing parry.3 4 Nor have stable criteria
emerged to evaluate or select among these interpretive tools; in
2017, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook lamented the
continuing absence of method in statutory interpretation
nearly seventy years after the publication of Llewellyn's lam-
poon.35 To this day, judges tend to apply interpretive methods
inconsistently such that even sophisticated litigants cannot
predict which canons of construction, dictionaries, or sources
of meaning may apply in any given case.3 6 And the prevailing
32 Henry Hart & Albert Sacks long ago observed that "[tihe hard truth of the
matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and con-
sistently applied theory of statutory interpretation." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
33 Justice Felix Frankfurter once lamented, "Unhappily, there is no table of
logarithms for statutory construction." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 247, 255 (David
M. O'Brien ed., 2d ed. 2004). More recently, Justice Scalia bemoaned that "Amer-
ican judges have no intelligible theory of what we do most." ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
34 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,401
(1950).
35 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,
84 U. CI. L. REv. 81, 83 (2017).
36 See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court's First Decade, 117
MICH. L. REv. 71, 97 (2018) (finding that parties before the Supreme Court regu-
larly brief canons that go unmentioned by the Court, and the Court frequently
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dialogue seems to offer no obvious path forward; Abbe Gluck
recently concluded that debates between textualism and
purposivism have "taken us as far as they can go."3 7
An important reason that these debates have largely run
aground, I argue, is that the leading theories of statutory inter-
pretation, textualism and purposivism,38 are as much theories
about how judges should behave vis-a-vis the legislatures as
they are theories about the interpretation and implementation
of statutory texts.3 9 Textualist and purposivist theories are
largely motivated by faithful-agent concerns that arise due to
the inherent tension of common-law judges interpreting stat-
utes enacted by democratically accountable legislatures.40
Anxiety about legislative supremacy has been called "a shibbo-
leth in discourse about statutory interpretation."4 1 A core disa-
greement between these approaches is not just about the
meaning and interpretation of text but also a debate about how
to judge it: 4 2 textualism and purposivism both "seek to provide
a superior way for federal judges to fulfill their presumed duty
cites to canons in opinions that were unmentioned in parties' briefs in the given
case). The Court is equally inconsistent in its reliance on dictionaries as sources
of evidence of ordinary usage and meaning: James Brudney and Lawrence Baum
have found only a "limited match" between the use of certain dictionaries in
litigants' briefs before the Supreme Court and in the Court's ultimate reliance on
dictionaries in its majority opinions. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis
or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts
Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 483, 532-33 (2013). In nearly every instance, the
briefs cited a dictionary that the opinion did not. Id. at 533.
37 Gluck, The Failure of Formalism, supra note 24, at 191.
38 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation-And the Irreducible Roles of Val-
ues and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 685, 686-87 (2014). For the
purposes of this Article, I follow Fallon's approach of subsuming intentionalism
under the broader rubric of purposivism. Id. at 686 n.3.
39 It is perhaps no coincidence that one of the field's most recent and promi-
nent texts, by Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second Circuit, is called
Judging Statutes. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014).
40 See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
225, 226 (1999) ("In my judgment the common law responsibilities of judges in
our political system are central to a thoughtful consideration of the problem of
interpretation.").
41 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319,
319 (1989).
42 For example, compare Willian N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001) (arguing from historical evidence that the federal
courts' role has always included the power to interpret statutes equitably as
cooperative partners with the legislature), with John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (2001) (arguing from historical
evidence that federal courts' role has always been as Congress's faithful agents,
not cooperative partners).
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as Congress's faithful agents."4 3 Indeed, it has been said that
the "fundamental question" for statutory interpretation is
"whether courts should view themselves as faithful agents of
the legislature or as independent cooperative partners."4 4
Problematically, judges tend to disagree just as much
about theories of judging as they do about theories of interpre-
tation.45 Many debates that are ostensibly about how to inter-
pret statutes (i.e., which canons of construction and sources of
statutory meaning to prioritize) often transform into debates
about how to judge statutes, fixating on separation-of-powers
concerns related to the proper role of courts vis-a-vis legisla-
tures. Similar separation-of-powers concerns also motivate de-
bates about judicially developed substantive canons like the
rule of lenity4 6 and Chevron deference, which are difficult to
justify on faithful agency terms alone.4 7
B. Enacting and Implementing Statutes
Debates about judicial faithful agency often overshadow
other equally pressing tasks for statutory interpretation theory.
One is to provide an account of how statutes communicate
meaning to, and alter the behavior of, relevant audiences. An-
other is to ensure that judicial interpretive theory enhances a
statute's capacity to ensure its relevant audiences get (and ef-
fectuate) the statutory message. This is because a critical
starting point for any theory of a functional legal system is that
those susceptible to the law are able to follow it.48 While the
concept of law is itself a contested and heavily debated con-
cept,4 9 I will start from the generally accepted premise that law
43 Manning, supra note 42, at 9.
44 KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 20 (2013).
45 See Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text-On Sequencing Effects in
Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439, 447 (2016) (noting
that "[d]ebates about interpretive method and the properjudicial role have gener-
ated friction" concerning whether to prioritize statutory text versus evidence of
legislative purpose or history, among other disagreements).
46 Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, supra note 10, at 386.
47 See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U.
L. REv. 109, 110 (2010).
48 E.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (rev. ed. 1969). Fuller identi-
fied among his eight principles of legality that citizens must know the standards
to which they are being held (second principle), that law should in general be
understandable (fourth principle), and that laws should not require conduct be-
yond the abilities of those affected by them (sixth principle).
49 See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept
(in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 148-49 (2002). See generally Fallon, "The Rule of
Law" as a Concept, supra note 13 (arguing that the rule of law should be under-
stood as a concept of multiple, complexly interwoven strands).
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is "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the govern-
ance of rules."5 0
In particular, Scott Shapiro has helpfully analogized laws
to specific social plans.5 1 On this account, the individuals
and/or entities subject to laws-what I call statutory audi-
ences-give functional meaning to these statutory plans
through implementation and practice. This, of course, is why
many legislative drafters are mindful of the intended audience
when they draft statutes-for the social plan to be effective, the
audience must be able to get the message.5 2
Communication theory suggests that statutory enactments
will inevitably be incomplete social plans-the communication
can only be completed through responsive action. This is be-
cause statutory texts communicate in a manner distinct from
other forms of linguistic communication. In contrast to the
speech acts5 3 of individual speakers, legislation constitutes a
form of collective speech act that is typically the result of one or
more compromises. Legislative compromises often result in in-
complete decisions about the precise legal content of the en-
acted legislation.5 4
Statutory plans as a form of communication thus may be
strategically and intentionally underspecified. As a result, co-
operative assumptions in ordinary conversation about how
speakers conventionally convey information-for example, that
the speaker intends to convey her message with specificity and
precision-often do not apply in the case of legislative speech
acts.5 5 The unique dynamics associated with the production of
legislative "speech" are especially important when making as-
sumptions about the sufficiency of the communicative content
conveyed by legislative texts. In many conversational contexts,
the audience may assume the speaker seeks-through her
choice of language, intentional omission or ambiguity, and im-
plicatures that suggest she meant something different than
50 See FULLER, supra note 48, at 106.
51 See SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 394.
52 See supra notes 1-3.
53 This term, which refers to an utterance that serves a function in communi-
cation, is frequently associated with the work of philosopher of language J.L.
Austin. E.g., J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
54 See MARMOR, supra note 5, at 49-50.
5s See Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation
and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAN-
GUAGE IN THE LAw 217, 251-52 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
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what she said-to provide the sufficient quality and quantity of
information necessary to convey her meaning.5 6
In legislative contexts, however, textual underspecification,
redundancy, and contradiction-both intentional and uninten-
tional-are common features of legislative texts, both in single
statutes5 7 and across related statutes.5 8 Among other things,
this may diminish just how much implied content can be rea-
sonably derived from legislative speech acts,5 9 with semanti-
cally enriched content subject to debatable and competing
inferences about how broadly or narrowly to read the statutory
text.60 Despite this, legislated "speech" often necessitates that
the audience-those implementing legislative plans-must fill
larger gaps as compared to instructions given in interpersonal
communication between individuals.6 1
Moreover, in contrast to most conversational communica-
tive contexts between speaker and audience, the legislative
context is inherently impersonal. Legislators address an audi-
ence comprised largely of those not personally known (or even
anticipated) by the legislature. Thus, both the precise execu-
tion of the plans, as well as those implementing them, may be
unknown at the time the broad plan is enacted.62 Given the
inherent ambiguity of human language and the legislature's
inability to anticipate future relevant applications,6 3 providing
56 See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 86-116 (1989)
(describing the ways in which an audience's context-specific assumptions about
which conversational maxims and implicatures apply in a given circumstance can
assist the audience in interpreting the speaker's meaning vis-a-vis the different
possible sentence meanings of the words the speaker has chosen).
57 As Gluck and Bressman have reported, legislative drafters often draft in-
tentionally redundant provisions, both to make prominent essential aspects of the
statute, and also to satisfy certain political stakeholders. Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 8, at 934-35.
58 See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 171, 179-80, (2000) (describing the notion that Congress
legislates with awareness of the contents of existing statutes as the "One-Con-
gress fiction").
59 Nevertheless, at least in certain circumstances, implied content that is
semantically encoded in legislative utterances may not be problematic to identify,
but implied content that is contextual or pragmatically enriched is often much
more difficult to pin down. See Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It
Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAw, supra note 55, at 83-84.
60 E.g., Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for Statutory
Interpretation fron the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REv. 1409, 1420 (noting
that the choice of how much text to consider will lead to false or contestable
implications).
61 See SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 136.
62 Id. at 217-20.
63 E.g., HART, supra note 13, at 128.
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"general rules, standards, and principles [as] the main instru-
ment[s] of social control [rather than] particular directions
given to each individual separately.""
The upshot of this is twofold. First, notions of judicial
"faithful agency" may often have limited utility when courts are
tasked with attributing legal meaning to ambiguous statutory
texts-there may simply not be an objective answer as to what
either the legislature "intended" nor what the text "means."
Rather, the legal meaning of statutes will often have to be de-
veloped through post-enactment implementation and interpre-
tation, or what Scott Soames calls "precisifying."65 To the
degree this is so, then judicial choices about which substantive
canons and interpretive methods to prioritize function to pro-
vide a legal grammar for how statutory audiences are expected
to engage with statutes, at least as much as these choices
function as an act of discovering the "plain" or "objective"
meaning of the text itself.
A second upshot is that while courts and government offi-
cials play an important role in precisifying statutory meaning,
statutes are also directed at other audiences, who also play an
important role in precisfying statutory meaning. Thus, for stat-
utes to function in their essential capacity as a means to imple-
ment social plans and coordinate societal behavior,6 6 in at least
some circumstances the uncertainty about statutory meaning
must also be resolved (and resolvable) by first-order statutory
audiences. After all, the rule of law is necessarily grounded in
the presumed capacity for all individuals to adopt plans,6 7 and
if courts were needed to supervise every instance of interpreta-
tion and to precisify every aspect of a given statutory plan, the
legal system would grind to a halt.
Importantly, not all statutory provisions seek to communi-
cate or alter behavior in the same manner, nor with respect to
the same audiences. Recall Meir Dan-Cohen's observation that
an "acoustic separation" often exists between conduct rules
and decision rules embedded in the criminal law.6 8 Whereas
conduct rules are specific statutory provisions that directly ad-
dress (and seek to expressly alter) the actions of lay audiences,
decision rules are aimed at guiding the (often discretionary)
64 Id. at 124.
65 E.g., SCOTr SOAMES, 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE 18 (2009).
66 See Postema, supra note 11, at 183-85.
67 SHAPIRo, supra note 11, at 119.
68 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 6, at 627.
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enforcement decisions of government officials, and thus often
have little to say directly to the public at large.6 9
This distinction-between statutory provisions that dele-
gate authority to government officials and those that directly
regulate the conduct of members of the public more broadly-
is essential to my theory of statutory audience. As Ed Rubin
has described, statutes have both "transitive" and "intransi-
tive" modes of communication and application.70 Transitive
statutes state the precise rule to be applied, which means that
the relevant statutory audiences might be. These kinds of stat-
utory provisions may also require judges to treat the statutory
communication as "complete," for rule of law reasons dis-
cussed below. put on notice simply by the enactment of the
rule itself. Given their direct application, transitive statutory
provisions may raise heightened concerns about notice and the
possibility of textual ambiguity or vagueness.7 1
By contrast, intransitive statutes merely set out the mech-
anism by which subsequent rules shall be developed-usually
by government officials, such as administrative agencies. As a
practical matter, "the ultimate target of the [intransitive] stat-
ute cannot know what behavior the statute will require."72 In
these circumstances, the capacity for the affected audience to
derive notice from the statutory text itself may be of less con-
cern, because no such notice can be derived from the text alone
because the legislative communication is incomplete. The legal
rule that will modify the audience's behavior will instead derive
from an administrative adjudication, regulation, or guidance
document promulgated by the agency in accordance with ad-
ministrative law and in furtherance of the intransitive statutory
delegation. So long as the statute provides a sufficient textu-
ally-enriched basis to guide the officials addressed with imple-
menting it, whether the statutory text alone provides clear
69 Id. at 630-31.
70 See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 369, 373 (1989).
71 Drawing a clear distinction between ambiguity and vagueness is essential
to understanding how statutes can give notice to relevant audiences. Whereas a
term is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two different, but potentially overlapping
meanings (such as the word "blue" conveying both the color and the mood), a term
is vague if among the range of normal applications of the term are borderline
cases separating instances in which the term clearly applies and when it clearly
does not (such as the word "tall"). See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and
Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 509, 512-13 (2011). Thus,
as I will explain in subpart II.B, whereas statutory ambiguity is an unavoidable
aspect of many statutes, statutory vagueness can raise essential rule-of-law con-
cerns, at least for criminal statutes directed at the general public.
72 Rubin, supra note 70, at 381.
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notice, or gives specific instructions to the audiences it seeks to
regulate, may be of less concern than for transitive provi-
sions.7 3 As I will argue in Part II, there may be good reasons to
prioritize different interpretive methods depending on whether
the relevant audience is regulated by a direct conduct rule or
an intransitive statutory delegation.
C. Interpreting Statutes
Because statutes address distinct audiences in different
ways, courts play a crucial role in helping statutory audiences
(and their interpreters) translate and derive meaning from un-
derspecified and often-ambiguous statutory enactments. How
a judge chooses to interpret a legal text will affect that text's
legal meaning just as much as the semantic meaning of the
text itself. This is because the semantic meaning derived from
"bare" text is not always synonymous with the legal meaning a
judge may attribute to it. A statute's legal meaning can be
derived not only from the statute's semantic content, but also
from contextual content associated with that statute, such as
evidence of the enacting legislature's intentions-collectively,
its communicative content.74
Most crucially, the legal content of a statute is also not
synonymous with its communicative content.7 5 When judges
apply substantive canons like the rule of lenity, clear notice
rules, or the plain meaning rule, they specify the legal meaning
that shall be derived from the statutory text. That meaning
may not be the meaning that one or more of its drafters in-
tended, nor the semantic meaning most commonly associated
with the term or phrase in question (to the degree one can be
clearly ascertained). In this sense, judicial interpretation pro-
vides the authoritative lens through which to view the statutory
text, framing and shaping the meaning(s) that others may per-
missibly derive from that text.
73 The textual statutory guidance is often very minimal. See Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that an "intelligible principle"
to guide agency exercises of authority may be as sparse as an instruction to
regulate in the "public interest").
74 As Lawrence Solum has articulated this distinction, the communicative
content of any legal text will not only stem from its semantic content (the meaning
of words and phrases that result from rules of syntax and grammar), but will also
be contextually (or pragmatically) enriched by additional contextual content that
contributes to the meaning of the legal utterance. Lawrence B. Solum, Communi-
cative Content and Legal Content, 89 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 487-88 (2013).
75 Nevertheless, the legal content and effect of a statutory utterance will not
necessarily be synonymous with a statute's bare semantic meaning, nor even its
contextually enriched content. Id. at 481-82.
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Understood this way, judicial rules of interpretation func-
tion as a kind of legal grammar: they provide guidance for
deriving legal meaning from oft-underspecified statutory text.
This is one reason why I call judges "second-order" interpret-
ers: their opinions not only resolve particular first-order inter-
pretive disputes, but also provide interpretive rules and
rationales that can have secondary effects for future cases.
(This, of course, assumes such rules are justified on the basis
of more than the mere ad-hoc whims of the particular judge(s).)
Most canons of construction seem to derive their authority
from the presumption that they apply across statutes. If so,
then their application will necessarily have the effect of altering
how future audiences may be expected to understand and in-
terpret legal texts that present similar ambiguities.7 6
Some judges have been explicit about this intended effect.
Justice Antonin Scalia's well-known sentiment toward legisla-
tive history is perhaps the most pronounced example. Justice
Scalia regularly declined to join portions of majority opinions
that discussed a statute's legislative history, and would instead
write separately to concur and explain why he had arrived at
that interpretation without resort to the legislative history.7 7 In
issuing a noncontrolling concurrence, his practice could not be
explained as seeking to sway the outcome of the instant case.
Moreover, the judicial audience for the concurrence was un-
likely to be the litigants in the instant case, or even future
audiences of that statutory provision, for the dispositive rea-
son(s) for the chosen meaning would be limited to those pro-
vided by the (controlling) majority or plurality opinion.
Rather, Justice Scalia's practice is best explained as a sec-
ond-order interpretive signal to fiiture first-order statutory
audiences more generally. He sought to constrain future lower
courts (and therefore also other first-order audiences) from
drawing on legislative history as a germane source of legal
meaning. 7  Such evidence, in Justice Scalia's view, should not
play a role in deciding the statute's legal meaning, even when
76 Indeed, a chief function of a separate concurrence is often to signal to
future audiences what that author believes to be the more persuasive approach to
interpretation.
77 E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("In my view, discussion of that point is where the remainder of the
analysis should have ended. Instead, however, the Court feels compelled to
demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history ... . That is not
merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the
law.").
78 See SCAHA, supra note 33, at 29-37 (arguing that consulting legislative
history is generally unhelpful, time-consuming, and expensive).
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such contextual evidence might provide a better explanation of
the statute's best-fit legal meaning than that derived from the
semantic content of the statute alone.79 Justice Scalia's objec-
tion to the use of legislative history is exemplary of broader
concerns about the relationship between interpretive method
and imputed legal meaning in statutory interpretation.
My thesis, which I will develop in the next two Parts, is that
because statutes communicate in distinct ways and to varied
audiences, different tools of interpretation may be more appro-
priate for transitive statutes than for intransitive ones, and for
statutes addressed primarily at some kinds of audiences than
others.8 0 Moreover, most statutes are directed at multiple
audiences, so a central task for many statutory interpretation
questions should be to identify the principal audience at issue,
which will often clarify what the statute means, how it applies,
and which normative concerns should prevail. Given all this,
an important criteria for any interpretive theory is whether any
given approach to interpretation allows for at least some (and
ideally much) interpretive congruence between how statutory
audiences may be legally expected to comply with, and derive
meaning from, the statutory text, and how judges use substan-
tive canons and interpretive methods to decide what the stat-
ute shall mean, and how it shall apply.8 1
II
THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
[A] legal scholar is able to research the principles of statutory
construction and in the quiet of the library indulge himself in
an act of ratiocination to conclude that one provision must
yield to the other.... Where a defendant is threatened by a
79 Scalia was skeptical that legislative history ever provided a better explana-
tion. Id. at 36 (arguing that legislative history had made "very little difference" in
the outcome of any case outcome over his prior nine terms on the bench).
80 As I will argue in Part II, there are persuasive jurisprudential reasons to
expect that transitive conduct-rule provisions that apply to members of the public
do conform to assumptions of ordinary language usage, even if those same as-
sumptions may not apply to purposefully underspecified and intransitive statu-
tory decision-rule provisions directed at official audiences like government
agencies. But see Greenberg, supra note 55, at 217-20 (questioning whether
communication theory provides the appropriate resources to determine a stat-
ute's legal meaning at all).
81 Fuller argued that interpretive congruence is critical, for a "lack of congru-
ence between judicial action and statutory law" can result in "damaging depar-
tures from other principles of legality: a failure to articulate reasonably clear
general rules and an inconsistency in decision manifesting itself in contradictory
rulings, frequent changes of direction, and retrospective changes in the law."
FULLER, supra note 48, at 82.
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loss of his liberty, . . . we do not find that the law requires his
fate should hang on a statute so drawn that it would excul-
pate him in one provision, inculpate him in another, and
then leave it to an exercise in legal research to determine
which should prevail.8 2
In this Part, I will develop a framework for considering
statutory interpretation questions from the standpoint of stat-
utory audience. In particular, I will concentrate on the rela-
tionship between substantive legal canons courts use to
evaluate statutory interpretation questions, and the interpre-
tive methods they use to attribute legal meaning to statutory
terms. By substantive canons, I mean judicially developed in-
terpretive doctrines such as the rule of lenity, the absurd re-
sults doctrine, the clear notice rule, and deference canons.
These substantive canons can be understood in part as audi-
ence canons, for courts apply them only when interpreting
statutory provisions directed at particular audiences, and they
do so-at least in part-for reasons related to audience-specific
rule-of-law norms. For example, the rule of lenity is invoked
only for the interpretation of criminal statutes broadly directed
at the general public, and on the basis that members of the
public must be given fair statutory notice when their conduct is
susceptible to criminal punishment or civil fines.8 3
By contrast, what I will call interpretive methods consist of
the wide range of semantic and syntactic canons of construc-
tion, evidence of linguistic usage, and other sources of statu-
tory meaning that courts use to attribute legal meaning to
statutory words and phrases. These include canons of con-
struction such as ejusdern generis, evidence of ordinary usage
such as dictionaries, and contextual sources of statutory
meaning such as the statute's legislative history and other evi-
dence of legislative intent.
I will argue that courts have generally been much more
attentive to the relationship between considerations of audi-
ence in the choice of substantive canons than in their choices
of interpretive methods. The rule of lenity, clear notice rule,
and Chevron administrative deference are all examples of sub-
stantive canons that are warranted when statutes are directed
at particular statutory audiences. Yet courts often fail to con-
sider whether the selection and prioritization of various inter-
pretive methods are all equally appropriate for the statutory
82 People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (App. Div. 1979) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting).
83 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 296-97.
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audience(s) and the audience-oriented substantive canon(s)
they deploy. Moreover, I will argue that choices about which
interpretive approaches to prioritize may be just as dependent
on questions of audience as substantive canons of interpreta-
tion are.
A. The Audiences of a Statute
Statutes have distinct and varied audiences, and these
audiences may diverge in both normatively and interpretatively
important ways. Broad variation exists in the knowledge,
training, sophistication, resources, and interpretive context of
different first-order statutory audiences, as well as the inter-
pretive intermediaries who assist them in ascertaining their
legal rights and obligations.34 Moreover, statutes seek to alter
the behavior of their audiences in very different ways: some
apply conduct rules directly to the public at large, others con-
script third-party interpreters to assist statutory audiences in
meeting their legal obligations, and others direct official audi-
ences to develop and implement specific rules from broad, in-
transitive mandates.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)8 5
exemplifies the diverse kinds of audiences a statute may have,
and the distinct ways statutes alter behavior and communicate
rules and rights.8 6 The IDEA, like many federal statutes, has
multiple (and often-adverse) audiences. A chief aim of the
IDEA is to use federal special education grants to induce states
to enhance opportunities for children with disabilities.8 7 The
IDEA does so in part by tying federal funding to state compli-
ance with administrative procedures that ensure children are
properly evaluated for their learning needs and then provided
with a public education suitable to those needs.8 8 To do so, the
84 E.g., Brudney & Baum, supra note 36, at 541 (noting that "criminal stat-
utes tend to affect a less educated population than laws regulating employers and
businesses in general").
85 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat.
175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-06, 1411-19, 1431-45,
1451-56, 1461, 1471-74, 1481-87 (2012)).
86 I will return to the statute later to examine how the Court handled ques-
tions of audience in Arlington Central School District Board ofEducation v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006), in infra subpart III.C.
87 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (2012).
88 See generally id. § 1414 (setting out required evaluation process). As of
2006, the year Murphy was decided, all fifty states received special education
grants. Special Education-Grants to States, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., https://
www2. ed.gov/fund/grant/apply/osep/b066 11 table.html [https://perma.cc/
UUR8-2EPA (last modified Feb. 7, 2006).
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IDEA conscripts both the Department of Education and state-
level education officials in each state, who together coopera-
tively implement these statutorily required procedures.8 9
But the IDEA also directly addresses its on-the-ground
audiences. It establishes the rights of parents, guardians, and
students, and sets out procedures that govern the resolution of
individual disagreements between a child's parent or guardian
and the child's school district concerning the appropriate edu-
cational accommodations for that child.9 0 The IDEA stipulates
that eligible parents and guardians are entitled to an annual
notice of their statutory rights furnished by their state, typi-
cally through a notice document that replicates much of the
statutory language itself.9 1
For a parent or guardian to bring an effective claim of inad-
equate accommodation, they often must hire both an attorney
to press their case and a qualified professional expert to evalu-
ate the child's needs and offer evidence that the child's pro-
vided education is inadequate.92 The IDEA establishes a
formal role for both attorneys and qualified professional ex-
perts under the statute.9 3 If the parent or guardian feels an
administrative hearing did not adequately resolve her con-
cerns, she is eligible to bring her case before a federal judge by
filing suit.9 4 Given the often-considerable costs associated
with challenging a local district's determination in court,9 5
Congress amended the IDEA in 1986 to enable courts, in their
discretion, to shift fees to cover reasonable attorneys' fees in
89 E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (2012) (establishing a federal role in monitoring,
technical assistance, and enforcement of state IDEA compliance).
90 Id. § 1415 (setting out procedural safeguards).
91 The IDEA requires that parents receive annually a copy of a procedural
safeguards notice. Id. § 1415(d)(2). As promulgated by the Department of Educa-
tion, this form replicates much of the statutory text directly in the notice docu-
ment; given that the law instructs that the notice be "written in an easily
understandable manner," one must presume the Department felt parents should
be able to understand the statutory text itself. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., IDEA 2004
MODEL FORM: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS NOTICE (2004), https://www2.ed.gov/pol-
icy/speced/guid/idea/modelform-safeguards.doc [http://perma.cc/XK3T-
2LHC].
92 PETER L. STRAUSS, CONGRESS AT WORK: A DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT FOR
COURSES IN LEGISLATION 65 (2016) (noting that expenses for psychologists are cen-
tral to any dispute over a child's special education needs).
93 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A) (2012).
94 Id. § 1415(1)(2).
95 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1031 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting the burden of litigation costs on children with disabilities).
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circumstances where a parent or guardian prevails on the
merits.96
Note how many distinct audiences directly addressed by
this statute. These include, among others: (1) the Department
of Education; (2) state-level education officials; (3) local school
officials; (4) the parent or guardian (and their child); (5) the
qualified professional experts; (6) the federal judge; and (7) the
parent or guardian's attorney.
TABLE 1: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCES OF PROVISIONS OF THE INDIVIDUALS














20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)
Id. § 1416(b)(1)
Id. § 1415(a)










"The Secretary shall ... monitor
implementation [through] oversight of
the exercise of general supervision by
the States."
"[E]ach State shall have in place a
performance plan. . . ."
"Any ... local educational agency that
receives assistance under [the IDEA]
shall establish and maintain
procedures ... to ensure that children
with disabilities and their parents are
guaranteed procedural safeguards."
" A copy of the procedural safeguards
shall be given to the parents . . . [and]
shall include a full explanation of the
procedural safeguards... written in an
easily understandable manner, . . .
related to . .. the opportunity to present
and resolve complaints."
"[The determination of whether the
child is a child with a disability . .. and
the educational needs of the child shall
be made by a team of qualified
professionals and the parent of the
child."
"rThe court, in its discretion, may award
reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the
costs . . . to a prevailing party who is
the parent of a child with a disability."
"[Riequirling) ... the attorney
representing aparty ... to provide due
process complaint notice [to school
officials]."
96 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2,
100 Stat. 796, 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012)).
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The IDEA is just one example of the distinctive audiences a
single statute may have, and the dynamically varied ways these
audiences can be expected to engage with the statute and avail
themselves of the rights, obligations, and procedures it sets
out. In the next sections I will topologize these different audi-
ences and identify how the law expects different audiences to
engage with statutory rules in different ways. These sections
also consider how substantive canons and interpretive meth-
ods employed by courts may alter the interpretive burdens
about how first-order audiences may face.
B. Ordinary Audiences
Formally, laypeople are a primary audience of many stat-
utes, just as parents and guardians are a primary audience
directly addressed by various provisions of the IDEA. Numer-
ous federal, state, and local statutes regulate nearly every as-
pect of daily life, from local ordinances that affect parking,
transportation, and housing, to statutes that regulate schools,
workplaces, information privacy, consumer and civil rights,
and use of the natural environment. While not all statutes seek
to communicate directly to laypeople in the manner that some
IDEA provisions do, many statutes do function to put members
of the public on notice of particular rights, responsibilities, and
obligations.
Yet even for transitive statutes that convey direct conduct
rules, one might object that lay audiences rarely actually en-
gage with statutes directly. Yet there are several reasons why
this concern should not mitigate the expectation that statutory
rules have the capacity to communicate effectively to the larger
public. First, a primary condition of legality is that law gener-
ally be minimally legible for its audiences, at least in circum-
stances where the consequences for noncompliance may be
severe.9 7
97 See FULLER, supra note 48, at 93.
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Moreover, statutes themselves often require that lay audi-
ences engage with,98 or at least be provided with,99 the direct
statutory text. As if to enhance the possibility for first-order
audience interpretation, some state legislatures have stipu-
lated that terms and phrases in state statutes shall be inter-
preted according to audience- and trade-specific meanings.0 0
Presumably, such requirements suggest that for at least some
statutes, the relevant audience(s) may be legally expected to be
put on notice by the text of the statute alone. If so, the statu-
tory text must communicate meaning relatively effectively.
In addition, while many statutory schemes ensure that law
is legible to the public at large through reliance on various
interpretive intermediaries like accountants, lawyers, compli-
ance officers, and government bureaucrats, these in-
termediaries often cannot fully absolve statutes of the need to
communicate effectively to relevant audiences. As I will dis-
cuss in subpart II.C, prevailing "mistake of law" doctrines often
disclaim the right for members of the public to rely on sources
of interpretive knowledge other than the statutory text itself.' 0
That judicial rules of interpretation help ensure that the
law communicates effectively to lay audiences is also a familiar
principle in both common law and private law, where numer-
ous doctrines reflect audience concerns. A chief interpretive
principle in property law has been said to be the "ease of com-
munication and cost of processing by the relevant audience" of
98 See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249, 250 (1985) (upholding a late
payment penalty against a taxpayer because "Congress has placed the burden of
prompt filing on the executor," "[the duty is fixed and clear," and "one does not
have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates"). Layper-
sons are expected to engage with statutory text in numerous aspects of their daily
lives, including statutory text that directly impacts their contracts, legal releases,
and workplace rights. See, e.g., Jefferson v. California Dep't of Youth Auth., 28
Cal. 4th 299, 307 (2002) (requiring that contracting parties seeking to unequivo-
cally release all unknown claims include in such agreements the reproduced text
of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542, which sets out statutory limits on the waiver of releases);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2872 (West 2019) (employment agreements that require em-
ployee to assign invention rights to employer must include written notification of
rights under § 2870, which typically appears in employee invention assignment
agreements).
9 See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-1 (2019) ("In all interpretations of statutes, the
ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words
connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signifi-
cation attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject
matter."). See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119
YALE L.J. 1750, 1824-29 (2010) (indicating that tensions exist between the inter-
pretations designed by the legislature and those enacted by the judiciary).
101 See infra Section II.C.1.
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the rule, so as to ensure that property law rules signal owner-
ship "at a low cost to a wide audience."102 For example, the
comnon-law rule of ownership at possession functions as a
communicative statement by the owner to all others that the
property in question has become theirs.1 0 3 Legal audiences'
varied interpretive circumstances also help to explain impor-
tant distinctions between the laws of contract and property.
The audience of many contracts may be limited to the con-
tracting parties and so permit bespoke legal entitlements; by
contrast property law rules must effectively communicate own-
ership to a wider range of potential third-party audiences, ne-
cessitating a more restricted and straightforward set of
rules.1 0 4 Moreover, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
prescribes different interpretive rules for merchants than non-
merchants, in part in recognition of differences in knowledge,
expectations, and experience between merchant and non-
merchant drafters of contracts.10 5
Finally, a prevailing assumption (or "necessary fiction")106
among judicial interpreters and legislative drafters alike is that
statutes must communicate in a manner in which their audi-
ences will be able to "get the message."I0 7 Notice concerns are
often expressly considered by courts when interpreting transi-
tive statutes that set out specific conduct rules for the general
public, such as many general criminal statutes. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated a will-
ingness to strike down "a criminal law so vague that it fails to
give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes."0
102 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audi-
ence, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1118, 1125 (2003).
103 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 77-79 (1985) (arguing that possession requires "a kind of speech, with the
audience composed of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in
question").
104 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
105 See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewel-
lyn's Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1146-48 (1985).
06 United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
107 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 5.
108 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (emphasis added)
(holding the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of
"violent felony" unconstitutionally void for vagueness); see also United States v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (same holding for 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s definition of
"crime of violence"); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210, 1223 (2018)
(same holding for residual clause of Immigration and Nationalization Act's defini-
tion of "aggravated felony").
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Given these considerations, statutory vagueness can be
avoided through thoughtful drafting, and can be policed on
constitutional grounds. However, problems with statutory am-
biguity-which are inherent in most legislatively enacted texts
for the reasons discussed in subpart I.B, supra-must be re-
solved in part through the interpretive process itself.109 Judges
have repeatedly cautioned that ambiguous statutes must not
be interpreted so as to put the regulated public on adequate
notice. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously de-
clared in McBoyle v. United States,'1o even if it were unlikely
that a criminal were to "consider the text of the law before he
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be
given to the world in language that the common world will un-
derstand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed."1 (Notably, Justice Holmes said this even about ma-
lun in se prohibitions like murder, where legal notice could
reasonably be inferred from generally shared moral under-
standings of right and wrong, without the need for specific
statutory textual notice. 112)
For statutes that address an audience of the general pub-
lic, courts often prioritize certain substantive canons and inter-
pretive methods that assist in ensuring adequate notice and
enhance the communicative capacity of the statute. Yet de-
spite broad patterns in prioritizing audience-specific methods
and interpretive approaches, I will argue that in practice,
courts often fall short of consistently employing methods of
interpretation congruent with the norms that motivate their
usage in the first place.
Several interpretive practices are exemplary of this prob-
lem, including (1) inconsistent and unexamined attributions to
"ordinary" meaning;1s (2) the rule of lenity's fraught relation-
ship with the concept of textual ambiguity; 114 and (3) the resort
to extratextual methods or sources of interpretation that are
unlikely to put ordinary individuals on notice as to what the
109 On the relevance of the distinction between the concepts of vagueness and
ambiguity, see supra note 71.
110 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
111 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
112 Indeed, it is probable, though problematic, that legal moralism often seems
to play a role in how courts interpret criminal statutes, even if they are not always
especially reflective about how they do so. See infra section II.B.4.
"13 See Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus
Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2017).
114 See Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule ofLenity, Ambiguity and
Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 101, 102 (2016).
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conduct that a statute prohibits.115 In addition, courts are
often unreflective in how they invoke what criminal law schol-
ars like Dan Kahan have described as "legal moralism"-the
presumption that concerns about textual notice may be dimin-
ished where a statutory prohibition conforms to the public's
broad conceptions about right and wrong conduct."6
To illustrate these inconsistencies, this subpart examines
each of these concepts by drawing on the canonical statutory
interpretation case of Muscarello v. United States. " 7 By way of
Muscarello, I will show why the question of audience should be
central to statutory interpretation: it helps to clarify questions
about how to decide between competing ordinary meaning(s);
the kind of ambiguity that warrants application of the lenity
rule; how extratextual sources may be appropriately drawn
upon; and when judicial notions about legal moralism can ob-
viate concerns about textual ambiguity.
1. Ordinary Meaning(s), Prototypical or Common
First, statutory audience can help to clarify precisely what
is to be achieved when seeking the "ordinary meaning" of a
statutory term or phrase. For statutes directed at lay audi-
ences, courts generally seek to assign to the statutory text its
"ordinary meaning," the semantic meaning attributed to a term
or phrase as ordinarily used in the English language."8 Of
course, ascertaining the "ordinary" meaning of a term or
phrase is not always straightforward, as demonstrated by the
debate in Muscarello v. United States.119 This is because courts
are often insufficiently specific about two critical threshold
questions: (1) whether "ordinary meaning" refers to the proto-
typical, permissible, or most common meaning of the relevant
term of phrase; and (2) how ambiguous (and to whom) the
statutory term at issue must be. As I will explain, considera-
tions about the audience to whom the statute is addressed will
115 See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says
or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 538 (1948) (arguing against the use of
legislative history because most people, and even many lawyers, do not have easy
access to legislative history).
116 See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (1997).
117 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
118 See Gries & Slocum, supra note 113, at 1424 (noting that "[the basic
premise of the ordinary meaning doctrine is that a legal text is a form of communi-
cation that uses natural language," and thus, for "reasons including rule of law
and notice concerns, textual language should be interpreted in light of the ac-
cepted and typical standards of communication that apply outside of the law").
119 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
168 [Vol. 105:137
THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
help to clarify whether the prototypical, permissible, or most
common meaning may be appropriately attributed to the
statute.
Muscarello concerned the interpretation of a mandatory
five-year prison term for any individual who "carries a firearm"
"during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime."12 0 The
Court was asked to decide whether two separate defendants,
who kept firearms located in, respectively, the locked glove
compartment and the trunk of their cars driven to the scene of
a drug trafficking crime, violated the statutory prohibition on
"carry[ing] a firearm," even if the firearm was in the car, not on
the person, during the drug trafficking incidents. 121 Both Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority,12 2 and Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenting Justices,
agreed that the term should be given its ordinary meaning. 123
TABLE 2: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Audience Relevant Relevant Statutory Text
Provision
Any person 18 U.S.C. "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of
§ 924(c)(1) violence or drug trafficking crime... , uses or
("Prohibited carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the
Acts") punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to
imprisonment for five years."
The problem is that deciding which meaning is the "ordi-
nary" one is often more difficult than deciding whether, as a
general matter, a term's ordinary meaning should apply. To
ascertain the "ordinary meaning" of statutory texts, courts-
and especially the contemporary Supreme Court-often refer to
dictionary definitions of the relevant word or words in ques-
tion.124 This is especially so when the statute in question is
directed at an ordinary or lay audience, as in the case of most
general criminal prohibitions.12 5 In theory, contemporary dic-
120 Id. at 126 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)).
121 Id. at 126-27.
122 Id. at 128.
123 Id. at 139-40.
124 See Brudney & Baum, supra note 36, at 486.
125 James Brudney and Lawrence Baum have identified that dictionary use by
the Supreme Court is significantly greater in criminal law cases than in commer-
cial law cases, id. at 520, and they speculate that this can be justified because
such laws "affect a less educated population" that is "less likely to receive legal
counsel about how to comply with statutory prohibitions, [and so] the unfiltered
ordinary meaning of text may assume greater importance," id. at 541.
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tionaries encapsulate commonly shared semantic meanings
and therefore reflect the ordinary usages of words.1 2 6 Yet indi-
vidual dictionary definitions may reasonably diverge about the
prevailing meaning of a word. 127 As essayist David Foster Wal-
lace once famously described, "dictionary wars" over meaning
and usage are often just as heated as judicial disagreements
about statutory meaning.12 8
Confusion about what is meant by "ordinary" meaning was
compounded in Muscarello by the selection of sources of evi-
dence of ordinary meaning deployed, for the majority seemed to
have a rather extraordinary audience in mind. In addition to
several contemporary dictionaries and four dictionaries of ety-
mology, the Muscarello majority also drew on evidence of "ordi-
nary" usage from works by "the greatest of writers," including
the King James Bible, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, and
Herman Melville's Moby Dick.12 9 From the standpoint of a
generalist audience, the majority's sources purporting to reveal
a term's "ordinary meaning" do not seem reflective of relevant
ordinary usage practices. After all, the firearm carriage prohi-
bition was originally passed as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968,130 had been amended in relevant ways by both the 1984
omnibus spending act3 1 and the 1986 Firearm Owners' Pro-
tection Act, 1 3 2 and was being interpreted in 1998. It is unclear
precisely what an English novel published in 1719, or even an
American novel published in 1851, revealed about the term's
126 Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 283 (1998) ("Modem lexicographers see their task as
describing how speakers of English use words.").
127 Id. at 285 (noting that modem lexicographers "do not expect their defini-
tion to give the absolute meaning of the word" but rather to give the reader enough
information "to surmise, at least approximately, its meaning in context") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
128 See David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the
Wars over Usage, HARPER'S MAG., April 2001, at 40, 40 (discussing the "ideological
strife and controversy" between "notoriously liberal" dictionaries and the "notori-
ously conservative" dictionaries designed as "corrective responses" to overly "per-
missive" liberal ones).
129 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998).
130 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 924(c), 82 Stat. 1213, 1224
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012)).
131 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012)) (amending statute to present "uses or
carries a firearm" prohibition for crimes of violence).
132 Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 449,
456-57 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012)) (amending stat-
ute to include mandatory sentencing enhancement for use or carriage of a firearm
in "a drug trafficking crime" in addition to a "crime of violence").
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"generally accepted contemporary meaning" in 1998, the mean-
ing the majority purported to be seeking.1 3 3
The majority's sources of ordinary meaning were thus not
especially "ordinary" at all, and could be susceptible to accusa-
tions of cherry-picking to support a preferred outcome.13 4
Muscarello exemplifies the sometimes ad-hoc manner in which
courts select sources of "ordinary" usage. Indeed, a recent
study of Supreme Court statutory interpretation opinions iden-
tified "a casual form of opportunistic conduct" not only in the
Justices' choice of dictionaries, but also in whether they used
historical dictionaries from the time of the statutory enactment
or contemporary ones at the time of the legal filing.13 5
In addition, the majority also surveyed the use of the term
"carries a firearm" in hundreds of American newspaper articles
in a manner akin to the then-obscure, now-burgeoning sub-
field of statutory interpretation known as corpus linguistics. 136
This approach to the study of ordinary meaning draws on pat-
terns of word usage across numerous popular sources in an
effort to provide a large-n account of how language is most
commonly used in contemporary society.13 7 In similar fashion,
the majority in Muscarello noted that according to its survey of
newspapers, in "perhaps more than one third" of instances, the
terms "carry," "vehicle," and "weapon" all appeared in the same
sentence, which the majority suggested supported its preferred
meaning of transporting a firearm.'3 3
The problem with these sources of ordinary usage, as
noted by the dissent, is that neither "dictionaries, surveys of
press reports, [nior the Bible tell us, dispositively, what 'carries'
means embedded in [the statute]."139 To demonstrate the ease
with which evidence of ordinary meaning can be cherry-picked,
the dissent cited its own "lessons from literature" and newspa-
per usages to show how "highly selective" the majority's choices
133 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139 (emphasis added).
134 See Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd-Do More Interpretive
Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 615-16 (2017) (arguing
that if judges follow rules against cherry-picking sources, then increasing the
number of sources will reduce discretion, but if cherry-picking sources is not
constrained, then judicial discretion will increase as the number of sources
increases).
135 See Brudney & Baum, supra note 36, at 490, 511-12.
136 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129-30.
137 See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788, 795 (2018).
138 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129.




were.140 Moreover, it noted that if "carries a firearm" connotes
transportation in a vehicle in one-third of searched articles,
"[olne is left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-
thirds of the time."141 This suspicion appears to be well sup-
ported: a recent study employing a prominent corpus linguis-
tics database found 104 instances where "carries a firearm"
and related firearm synonyms "indicated a sense of carry a
firearm on one's person, while only five instances suggested a
carry a firearm in a car sense."'42
Instead, the dissent concluded that the verb "carries" may
be susceptible to either meaning, so the crucial question
should be what the term "carries a firearm" tends to connote in
everyday usage: immediacy or active employment. '43 If any-
thing, evidence of common everyday usage would suggest that
the statutory prohibition should not reach transporting a fire-
arm in a locked trunk or glove compartment. The disagree-
ment in Muscarello thus implicitly turned on what it means to
seek a statutory term's "ordinary meaning" and whose under-
standing of ordinary meaning should prevail. '4 After all, re-
cent empirical scholarship suggests that ordinary readers of
English will read more or less ambiguity into a statutory provi-
sion depending not only on their preferred interpretive policy
outcome, but also on whether they are asked if the term is
ambiguous for them, or for an ordinary reader of English.145
As Thomas Lee and Stephen Mouritsen have helpfully
identified, when judges speak of ordinary meaning, they seem
to be "speaking to a question of relative frequency-as in a
point on [al continuum" from (1) a possible meaning, to (2) a
common meaning, to (3) the most frequent meaning, to (4) the
exclusive meaning.146 Yet courts are rarely clear about which
of these possibilities they have in mind when they speak of
"ordinary" meaning. Yet what meaning is meant by "ordinary"
meaning is often dispositive of the outcome in the case of a
dispute about the legal meaning of a term.
140 Id. at 142-44.
141 Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
142 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 137, at 847.
143 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 150.
144 See, e.g., James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental
Statutory Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 962 (2019) (finding that lay audiences
understand particular terms like "but-for causation" differently than do judges).
145 See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About
Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYsIs 257
(2010).
146 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 137, at 800.
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Moreover, courts often appear to have yet another ordinary
meaning in mind: (5) the prototypical meaning, which is the
meaning most strongly associated with a given term in a given
context. Thus, the ordinary sense of the term "vehicle" would
be the vehicle that is most "vehicle-like."14 7 Lawrence Solan
has similarly noted that judicial disagreements over ordinary
meaning "can be seen as battles among the justices over defini-
tions versus prototypes."1 4 8 Thus, the disagreement in Mus-
carello is better explained as a debate about whether the
ordinary meaning of "carries a firearm" should be determined
on the basis of its common meaning (which would include
transporting a firearm, per the majority), or according to its
prototypical (or most frequent) meaningl49-which was to
"pack[ ] heat," per the dissent. 150
2. Ambiguity and the Rule of Lenity
Muscarello also illustrates underlying tensions in the appli-
cability and application of the rule of lenity to statutory terms
for which the ordinary meaning is sought. The lenity rule in-
structs that when there are two rational readings of a criminal
statute, courts should choose the harsher one only when Con-
gress "has spoken in clear and definite language."s1 5 The lenity
doctrine is a pragmatic and necessarily audience-oriented ca-
non, for it is invoked by courts only when the statutory audi-
ence is the public at large.1 5 2 Here, the stated concern is fair
notice-an audience norm that is especially important when a
statute is directed at the general public.15 3
However, the lenity doctrine implicates two important con-
siderations necessary for the rule to achieve its pragmatic pur-
pose. The first concerns how much ambiguity must be present
before invoking the rule, for empirical research suggests that
ambiguity is often in the eye of the beholder.' Across their
147 Id. at 801-02.
148 Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and
Rules in Legal Interpretation, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 258 (2001).
149 Id. at 258-59.
150 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 145 (1998).
151 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
152 See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 433-34 (1985)
(applying the rule of lenity when determining what mental state the government
had to prove in a case involving illegally acquiring or possessing food stamps); see
also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1099 n.6 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (considering "when an ordinary citizen seeks notice of a statute's scope" in
deciding whether the rule of lenity should be invoked).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (explaining
that one of the purposes of the rule of lenity is to provide fair notice).
154 See Farnsworth et al., supra note 145, at 271.
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jurisprudence, the Justices on the Supreme Court have in re-
cent years articulated what commentators have described as at
least four different versions of the lenity test.15 5 The most
stringent version, which calls for the invocation of lenity only in
the case of "grievous ambiguity," is the version articulated by
Justice Breyer and which he applied in Muscarello.156
As Dan Kahan has suggested, pushing the rule of lenity to
the bottom of the lexical ordering hierarchy,15 7 after exhaus-
tively canvassing sources of interpretive meaning, may make it
"impossible" for lenity to perform its function of ensuring ade-
quate notice.15 8 Muscarello thus suggests that ambiguity and
meaning ultimately depend on which (and how many) dictiona-
ries one consults, newspapers to which one subscribes, au-
thors one reads, 1 and canons one considers,16 0 and when
one decides to stop seeking additional evidence of usage alto-
gether. And as Justice Scalia once noted, "[mlost cases of ver-
bal ambiguity in statutes involve . . . a selection between
accepted alternative meanings shown as such by many
dictionaries."161
Rather, where the choice is between a prototypical mean-
ing frequently associated with usage of the phrase in question
155 These range from invoking lenity unless the government's interpretation is
.unambiguously correct"; to invoking lenity when there is "reasonable doubt"
about the term's meaning; to invoking it only when the government's proposed
interpretation seems to be "no more than a guess." Ortner, supra note 114, at
103-04.
156 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (emphasis
added).
157 Adam Samaha has defined lexical ordering in statutory interpretation as
"the prioritization of one set of considerations such that others might or might not
be ruled out." Adam M. Samaha, If the Text Is Clear-Lexical Ordering in Statutory
Interpretation, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 162 (2018).
158 Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, supra note 10, at 386.
Kahan argues that this incoherence suggests that the rule of lenity instead func-
tions as a nondelegation doctrine more ideologically compatible with conservative
Justices like Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 393. Yet lenity had long been invoked
prior to the Justice Scalia-led revival of arguments for textualism as the basis of
non-delegation. E.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). Moreover, it
neither explains why Justices Scalia and Thomas sometimes rejected the rule's
applicability in a case where their colleagues invoked it, see Yates v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1098-99 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting), nor explains why
more purposivist and delegation-friendly Justices such as Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor have invoked lenity to narrow their own discretion and Congress's
tendency to punt the issue, see id. at 1088 (majority opinion).
159 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129-30.
160 Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, supra note 10, at 386
(noting that the rule of lenity becomes dispositive only when a court gives the rule
priority over other interpretive conventions that create or resolve statutory
ambiguities).
161 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994).
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that would narrow its application, and a common meaning that
would broaden it, the rule of lenity will enhance notice only if
the narrower, prototypical meaning prevails. This is especially
so where that meaning would seem to comport with how the
general public is most likely understand the phrase "carry a
firearm"-as in "packing heat," rather than "transporting by
vehicle." Only in circumstances where the statute's relevant
audience is likely to associate the term with the broader mean-
ing would it be coherent to decline to apply the lenity rule.
Indeterminacy as to how much ambiguity must be present
to invoke the lenity rule is exacerbated by a second problem.
Because the Court has provided no coherent account of how to
prioritize or exhaust sources and canons before invoking the
lenity rule,16 2 neither first-order audiences nor even litigants
can know when they have adequately fulfilled their interpretive
burden to ascertain an ambiguous term's meaning. This also
thwarts the rule's purpose. And resolving ambiguity by resort-
ing to additional sources comes at a cost: the time, resources,
and effort necessary to consult those sources. From the stand-
point of statutory audience, heightening interpretive expecta-
tions may reduce capacity to understand the law. As Ryan
Doerfler has argued, democratic and fair notice norms may be
just as appropriate in guiding choices of interpretive method
over criminal statutes, since they "minimize the epistemic bur-
den for involved parties."163
This is not to say that courts should always limit the evi-
dence about semantic content to a single preferred grammar
canon, or sources of ordinary meaning to a single dictionary,
nor to categorically exclude contextual sources of meaning that
extend beyond the text itself, as a strict lexical ordering rule
might require.16 4 Rather, for the rule of lenity to be coherent, it
must be applied in a principled fashion, which requires consis-
tent prioritization of interpretive methods and sources, includ-
ing ordinary meaning and usage sources, whether those
sources are dictionaries, corpus linguistics, or other evidence
of linguistic usage that is relevant to resolving the ambiguity of
statutory text. The lenity doctrine may be premised on the
fiction that statutory text must give members of the public
notice, but Justice Scalia was not wrong in lamenting that this
162 Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, supra note 10, at 390-91
(noting that some Justices rank the rule of lenity lexically subsequent to all other
interpretive conventions, while others advocate "pushing lenity up to the top of
the interpretive hierarchy").
163 Doerfler, supra note 10, at 1040.
164 See Samaha, supra note 157, at 162.
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"necessary fiction descends to needless farce when the public
is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports."6 5
Statutory audience thus provides one such rule of deci-
sion: an interpretive framework that conceptualizes first-order
audiences helps to explain circumstances under which the
plain meaning rule's conditional "less is more" approach gains
particular normative purchase.16 6 Where the statute's audi-
ence is the general public, ordinary usage and meaning, dic-
tionary definitions, and canons reflecting common linguistic
practices may be more reasonable guides to meaning than
more obscure contextual sources, such as legislative history or
whole code analysis. If the rule of lenity is to accomplish its
aim-to relieve defendants of culpability for conduct whose
criminality is textually ambiguous-then it would only seem
appropriate to apply the rule before consulting sources of inter-
pretation that it may be reasonable to expect such defendants
to consider, let alone ones that are unlikely to be reflective of
so-called "plain" meaning.
3. Extratextual Meanings
Muscarello also illustrates why the thoughtful use of ex-
tratextual interpretive conventions and sources is essential to
any theory of statutory interpretation that conforms to basic
principles of legality. When a statute's first-order audience is
the general public, it is one thing to draw heavily on dictionary
definitions and other evidence of semantic meaning or ordinary
usage; it is another to decide what to do once those sources
yield competing plausible interpretations. In Muscarello, the
majority did not stop after considering evidence of ordinary
meaning. Instead, the opinion proceeded to apply the whole
statute canon6 7 and engage in a lengthy examination of Con-
gress's intent as manifested in the legislative history. 168 These
methods of interpretation would seem much less likely to help
communicate a statutory term's "ordinary" meaning to a gener-
alist audience-especially when set against the backdrop in
which the rule of lenity might apply. Indeed, one argument for
a textualist approach to interpretation that would preclude
165 United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
166 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfier, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84
U. CHi. L. REv. 539, 546 (2017) ("There are reasons to consider all pertinent
information. There are reasons to categorically discard certain kinds of pertinent
information. But why consider it only sometimes?")
167 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 135-36.
168 Id. at 133-34, 137.
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"legislative process" evidence like legislative history is that
Congress should "accommodat[e] the linguistic expectations of
the regulated, rather than the other way around."1 6 9
Depending on the context, reliance on evidence of contex-
tual meaning, like legislative history, may accommodate the
linguistic expectations of the statute's official audience. This is
especially true when the statutory provision is intransitive and
where "the regulated" audiences will not be governed primarily
by the statutory text alone, but by regulations subsequently
promulgated from it. By contrast, legislative history can be a
particularly obscure and inaccessible source of legal knowledge
for lay audiences of statutory conduct rules, and even for many
of their lawyers.170 These concerns are especially heightened
when interpreting conduct rules that carry criminal conse-
quences. This issue was first prominently raised by Justice
Jackson-the most recently appointed Supreme Court Justice
to have become a lawyer by way of apprenticeship rather than
by law degree.171 Justice Jackson once wrote that there were
"practical reasons" to accept the "meaning which an enactment
reveals on its face" rather than turning to legislative history:
Laws are intended for all of our people to live by.. . . [Tihe
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer
who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of
housing, or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole con-
gressional history.... To accept legislative debates to modify
statutory provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large
part of the country.17 2
While legislative history is far more readily available to lawyers
today, 7 3 those without Westlaw, Lexis, and/or ProQuest Con-
gressional accounts may not think so, and any citizen without
legal training is unlikely to know where to begin.17 4
169 Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2193, 2202 (2017).
170 Jackson, supra note 115, at 538.
171 Kashmir Hill & David Lat, You Don't Need No Stinkin' Law Degree to Be on
the Supreme Court, ABOVE L. (May 14, 2010, 10:01 AM), https://abovethe-
law.com/2010/05/you-dont-need-no-stinkin-law-degree-to-be-on-the-supreme-
court/ [https://perma.cc/HUB6-7DMQ].
172 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
173 Moreover, even modem-day Justices often seem unaware of the finer
points of identifying relevant evidence from legislative history. See infra section
II.D.2.
174 See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicor: Textualisrn, LEGAL THEORY BLOG
(Jan. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://1solum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2018/01/le-
gal-theory-lexicon-textualism.html [https://perma.cc/7XKK-H6YZ ("One of the
important rule of law values is publicity: the law should be accessible to ordinary
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Nevertheless, Justice Jackson's concern about accessibil-
ity does remain for statutes whose audiences are ordinary indi-
viduals who are expected to be on notice of the law's
requirements whether or not they have, or can even afford,
access to counsel. This critique was among Justice Scalia's
recurring criticisms of legislative history. In his concurrence in
Conroy v. Aniskoff,175 Scalia argued that legislative history "un-
dermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, un-
like us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing
historical research by lawyers."17 6 More recently, Adrian
Vermeule has argued that the costs associated with legislative
history research for litigants are high, while the benefits are, at
best, difficult to specify.1 7 7 Justice Jackson, Justice Scalia,
and Vermeule were right to recognize that statutory interpreta-
tion theory should be mindful of the legal and interpretive ex-
pectations that judicial interpretive methodologies necessarily
impose on the relevant statutory audience(s), and this critique
is most pressing when those audiences are laypeople. Yet
these arguments might carry far less weight when the relevant
statutory audiences are more sophisticated and well-
resourced, and where the provision in question contains no
direct conduct rule aimed at a broad and generalist audience-
a consideration I will address in subpart II.D, infra.
4. Legal Moralism as Contextual Evidence of Meaning
In addition to semantic and contextual sources of statutory
meaning, members of the public also probably discover or in-
tuit criminal statutory prohibitions through a process that Dan
Kahan has called "legal moralism,"1 78 the idea that criminal
prohibitions largely condemn conduct already widely believed
to be immoral.179 Although legal moralism was not explicitly
invoked by the majority in Muscarello-likely because the idea
is hard to justify on faithful agency grounds-the concept
might support the broader interpretation of the firearm car-
citizens. Ordinary citizens are likely to interpret statutes to have their plain
meaning, because ordinary folks rarely have the training to understand legislative
history and even if they did have such training, it would simply be too costly to
analyze the legislative history of statutes to determine their meaning."); see also
Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARv. L. REv. 542, 560-61 (2009) (question-
ing whether legislative history diminishes the fair notice of laws).
175 507 U.S. 511 (1993).
176 Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
177 ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 192 (2006).
178 See Kahan, supra note 116, at 140.
179 Id. at 140-42.
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riage prohibition. One might therefore argue that the need for
clear textual notice is diminished where legal moralism alone
can identify conduct that is morally, and therefore legally,
prohibited. 8 0
In Muscarello, the majority noted that the statute's basic
purpose was to combat the "'dangerous combination' of 'drugs
and guns"' by "persuading a criminal 'to leave his gun at
home.'"181 This suggests it would be intuitive for ordinary indi-
viduals to know that carrying a gun during and in relation to a
drug trafficking transaction warrants moral disapprobation,
regardless of statutory notice. If so, then the rule of lenity
might have less normative purchase in requiring clear textual
notice of criminality, because the public may be assumed to be
on moral notice.
The problem with relying on legal moralism to salvage tex-
tual notice problems is that members of the public may reason-
ably disagree about both the immorality or relative
dangerousness of some kinds of conduct. This might include
whether certain conduct warrants additional penalties. (At
present, this is especially evident in the states' and the federal
government's varied and in-flux decriminalization of marijuana
use.) In cases of reasonable disagreement, legal moralism may
not necessarily obviate problems with criminal statutory ambi-
guity. In Muscarello, for instance, reasonable individuals might
disagree that regularly storing a legally obtained firearm in a
vehicle is an inherently morally wrongful activity-many, for
example, may consider doing so to be a reasonable approach to
personal safety, even if they might, on certain occasions, also
engage in criminal conduct.
Moreover, what the majority in Muscarello seemed to per-
ceive as obviously immoral conduct (keeping a firearm any-
where near a drug dealing transaction) might, for another
reasonable citizen, be an obviously moral one (exercising a citi-
zen's Second Amendment right to store a firearm in their vehi-
cle for self-defense, even if that citizen on certain occasions
engages in criminal conduct himself). Nor is this answer likely
to be uniform across all communities. Particularly in rural
areas, firearm possession is significantly more common,182 and
180 Id. at 137-43. But see Justice Holmes' admonition in McBoyle, supra notes
110-111 & accompanying text.
181 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998).
182 Rich Morin, The Demographics and Politics of Gun-owning Households, PEW





a positive association with gun culture in general is more prev-
alent,183 so any incidental carriage of a firearm in a vehicle may
not, in fact, carry with it the taint of immorality that the Mus-
carello majority seemed to assume. Given these considera-
tions, a further sentence of incarceration may not seem so
morally righteous after all.
In at least some circumstances, then, deciding which
moral intuitions should form the basis of the criminal law may
be just as contentious as which methods of interpretation to
rely upon. When it comes to assuaging concerns about textu-
ally ambiguous criminal prohibitions, legal moralism may raise
as many questions as it resolves, or allow judges to import their
own beliefs about the moral blameworthiness of particular
conduct.
C. Reliance on Influential Intermediaries as Interpreters
Statutory audience also helps to explain distinctions the
law draws in how lay audiences may rely on influential in-
termediaries to help them interpret and comply with statutes.
These intermediaries have no formal legal authority to pro-
nounce the law's meaning, but their daily practices and institu-
tional roles nevertheless position them to influence how
members of the public understand the law. Often, influential
intermediaries assist lay audiences in ensuring compliance
with statutes regulating everyday activities. These include fire-
arms dealers who are legally responsible for communicating
registration and carry requirements to customers, ' 8 4 contrac-
tors who ensure homeowners' remodels are completed accord-
ing to local building codes, 8 5 and accountants who guide their
clients through filing requirements under the tax code.
But influential interpreters also include industry groups
like the Chamber of Commerce and labor unions; interest
groups like AARP and the NRA; and interested third parties like
insurers and indemnifiers.186 They include bar, medical, and
183 See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 93-96 (2013).
184 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26835-26885 (West 2018) (describing notifi-
cation and training obligations of licensed firearms retailers in selling firearms to
customers).
185 See, e.g., Why Are Building Permits Required?, BUILDING IN CAL., http://
buildingincalifornia.com/building-department/ [https://perma.cc/6S6H-T4NZI
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (noting that if a property owner does not hire a licensed
contractor, they assume the same responsibilities and are assumed to have the
same level of knowledge of code compliance as a licensed contractor).
186 See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130
HARV. L. REv. 1539, 1579-82 (2017) (describing the role that private insurers play
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police officers' associations, all of which educate their members
about statutory and regulatory rules relevant to them,187 and
advocate on their behalf when interpretive confusion arises.
Influential interpreters also include employers, who have obli-
gations to inform their employees about their legal rights and
duties, and therefore serve as critical transmitters of legal
knowledge.18 8 These influential interpreters assist in what
socio-legal scholars call "legal readings"-the practical, every-
day signals and rules laypeople internalize to understand what
the law means and requires.'8 9
The importance of influential interpreters can be recog-
nized by the fact that many statutes are often addressed prima-
rily at these influential interpreters, rather than the lay
audiences they assist in compliance. The law recognizes this
reliance by forgiving ordinary first-order interpreters for mis-
takes of legal interpretation. Consider the differential judicial
treatment of mistakes of criminal law and mistakes of tax law.
Courts seem to presume that the operative audience for many
provisions of the tax code are not taxpayers themselves, but
more sophisticated and influential intermediaries like account-
ants, tax software companies, and IRS officials. o9 0 Perhaps for
this reason, courts are sometimes forgiving of taxpayers' inter-
pretive mistakes that carry punitive consequences, provided
they reasonably relied on those intermediaries. In contrast, the
criminal law generally seems to expect that the primary audi-
ence is laypeople themselves, and the law rarely forgives mis-
takes of law, no matter how well intentioned defendants were in
reasonably relying on influential intermediaries.
in interpreting and communicating changes in the law to the police departments
they indemnify).
187 Many industry associations regularly update their members as to changes
in the interpretation of laws relevant to them. E.g., Resources, CAL. PEACE OF-
FICERS' ASS'N, https://cpoa.org/resources/ [https://perma.cc/52B6-QLAM] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2018) (providing "client alerts" and "legal updates" to alert mem-
bers of developments in the law relevant to their positions).
188 For example, both federal and state laws require employers to provide
notice of specific rights to their employees in the form of approved posters to be
placed in conspicuous locations within the workplace, but most such notices are
themselves provided to employers by third-party influential interpreters. See Orly
Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96
B.U. L. REv. 869, 891-92 (2016).
189 Sally Riggs Fuller, Lauren B. Edelman & Sharon F. Matusik, Legal Read-
ings: Employee Interpretation and Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 200,
201-02 (2000).




1. Reliance and Mistakes of Criminal Law
In the criminal law, following Section 2.04 of the Model
Penal Code (MPC),191 most states have implemented "mistake
of law" doctrines that permit criminal defendants to raise a
mistake of law defense only when they acted in reliance on an
official statement of the law.1 9 2 The MPC's definition of official
interpreters excludes many likely sources of lay legal knowl-
edge. Under the MPC, "official statement[s]" generally include
only the interpretations of courts or the "official interpretation
of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility
for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law
defining the offense."19 3 Thus, individuals may not defend
their good faith statutory noncompliance on the basis that they
were misinformed by influential intermediaries,194 regardless
of influential intermediaries' expertise and practical experi-
ence, as well as the likelihood that laypeople will rely on them
in real-world practice.
The case of People v. Marrero exemplifies the tensions
raised when judicial statutory interpretation is inattentive to
audience considerations and the ways laypeople are likely to
engage with the law. 19 Marrero concerned a New York resident
who worked as a corrections officer at a federal prison in Con-
necticut and was arrested and charged with the unlicensed
possession of a handgun in New York City.196 Marrero had
believed that as a federal corrections officer, he qualified as a
"peace officer" exempt from firearm registration and carriage
requirements under New York law, 197 which defined a peace
officer as including "[a]n attendant, or an official, or guard of
any state prison or of any penal correctional institution." 19 8
191 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
192 Athy Poulos-Mobilia, Ignorance or Mistake of Law-Will the Memory Ever
Fade?: People v. Marrero, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 114, 115 (1987).
193 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (AM. LAw INST. 2017).
194 A notable exception is tax law, discussed below.
195 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).
196 David De Gregorio, People v. Marrero and Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L.
REv. 229, 233 (1988).
197 People v. Marrero, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832, 832 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (citing N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 265.20(a)(1)).
198 Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §2.10(25)) (emphasis added).
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TABLE 3: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 2.10(25)
Audience Relevant Relevant Statutory Text
Provision
Persons N.Y. Crim. "[Oinly the following persons shall have the
designated as Proc. Law powers of, and shall be peace officers: ...
peace officers § 2.10(25) correction officers of any state correctional
facility or of any penal correctional
institution."
The trial court concluded that the statute was ambiguously
drawn as to whether the word "state" modified only "prison" or
also "any penal correctional institution,"'9 9 so it dismissed the
charge on lenity grounds, reasoning that any basis for exclud-
ing state corrections officers would seem to apply equally to
federal corrections officers. Despite this, a divided appellate
court reversed the dismissal, with the majority drawing on the
whole statute canon as well as the legislative history of a re-
lated provision in the same statute to determine that the stat-
ute was insufficiently ambiguous to apply the rule of lenity.2 00
Several dissenters objected to the heightened interpretive re-
quirement that methods like legislative history impose on ordi-
nary interpreters like Marrero.20 1 As in Muscarello, the court in
Marrero relied on interpretive methods unlikely to enhance the
notice function of the law for its lay audience, and it did so to
decide whether to invoke the rule of lenity, effectively under-
mining the notice-enhancing purpose that justifies the canon
in the first place.
But Marrero also shows why the criminal law often requires
laypeople to be legally responsible for statutory interpretation,
rather than to outsource that obligation to the influential in-
termediaries who might assist them. Once Marrero's charge
was reinstated, he sought to assert a reasonable mistake-of-
law defense, asserting that he had a mistaken but reasonable
prior belief that he had been exempt because of advice given by
several influential interpreters, all of whom indicated that he
did not need to register his firearm due to his status as a
federal corrections officer.2 02 These included the professor of
two of his criminal justice courses at community college, who
was himself both a police officer and an attorney; the dealer
199 Id. at 833.
200 People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386-87 (App. Div. 1979).
201 Id. at 388 (Lynch, J., dissenting); see epigraph, supra note 82 and accom-
panying text.
202 De Gregorio, supra note 196, at 240-41.
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from whom Marrero had purchased his firearm, and who said it
was routine for dealers in the city to sell weapons to federal
corrections officers without imposing the registration require-
ment on them; and both the personnel director of Marrero's
prison and the president of the Manhattan facility's union,
each of whom was prepared to testify to the widespread belief
that federal corrections officers did not need to register their
firearms in the city.2 0 3
Because none of these interpreters were deemed "official"
under New York law, the trial court ruled that Marrero could
not raise a reasonable mistake of law defense and excluded
most of the evidence proffered in connection with it at trial.204
Most glaringly, the court also excluded as evidence a memoran-
dum from the New York City Police Department addressed to
employees of the Metropolitan Corrections Center in Manhat-
tan, stating that federal corrections officers living in New York
were peace officers exempt from the permit requirement; be-
cause that precinct was not the official state agency responsi-
ble for New York's penal code, even that interpretation,
however influential in practice, could not be relied upon.205
Marrero was subsequently convicted, and on appeal, a ma-
jority of the Court of Appeals held that the statutory mistake-
of-law defense was not available to Marrero because his mis-
take was based on his "personal misreading or misunderstand-
ing" of the law,206 rather than the official "agency, or body
legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privi-
lege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or
law."2 0 7 In essence, the Court held that the law prohibits reli-
ance on the very influential interpreters that members of the
general public may be most likely to turn to for assistance.
2. Reliance and Mistakes of Tax Law
In contrast to the general criminal law, courts interpreting
criminal tax laws often permit laypeople to rely on mistaken
influential interpreters when determining how to comply with
the law, presumably because tax statutes are often considered
to be especially difficult to interpret and follow. And because
tax laws are often drafted for sophisticated and influential
203 Id. at 240-41 n.52, 241 n.54.
204 Id. at 241.
205 Id. at 241 & n.54.
206 People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987) (emphasis added).
207 Id. at 1070 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(2)).
184 [Vol. 105:137
THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
audiences like tax preparers and tax software companies,2 0 8
the law is more forgiving of mistakes of law in the criminal tax
context than in the general criminal context, provided the pro-
vision in question seems to require reasonable reliance.
Consider, for example, the case of United States v. Boyle, in
which an estate executor relied on an attorney to assist in filing
a federal estate tax return.209 When the executor failed to file
by the statutory deadline, he was assessed a penalty for failure
to file a return due to "willful neglect." He appealed, arguing
that his failure to file on time was due to a "reasonable cause,"
i.e., reliance on his tax attorney's mistaken advice.2 10 The Su-
preme Court unanimously rejected that argument, concluding
that "Congress has placed the burden of prompt filing on the
executor, . . . [and] the duty is fixed and clear."2 11 In a sense,
the Court's conclusion was that the primary audience for the
prompt filing burden was the taxpayer, and because it was
clearly indicated, it was no excuse that the taxpayer expected
his attorney would determine the relevant deadline for him.
TABLE 4: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 6651
Audience Relevant Relevant statutory text
Provision
Taxpayers 26 U.S.C. "In case of failure to file any return required under
§ 6651 (a)(1) [relevant provisions] on the date prescribed therefor
.... unless it is shown that such failure is due to
reasonable cause and not due to willfi" neglect,
there shall be added to the amount required to be
shown as tax on such return [additional
penalties]."
But the Court also clarified that in other circumstances,
"reliance on the opinion of a tax adviser may constitute reason-
able cause for failure to file a return," because when an ac-
countant or tax attorney "advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax
law," it would be reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on such
advice,2 12 and so any failure to do so would not constitute
willful neglect. The Court concluded that "[mlost taxpayers are
not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an
accountant or [tax] attorney," whereas "one does not have to be
208 See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 4, at 54-55.
209 469 U.S. 241, 242 (1985).
210 Id. at 244 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1)).
211 Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 250-51.
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a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates"
and must be filed when they are due.2 1 3
The distinction the Court seemed to draw in Boyle was that
while taxpayers may be the audience for certain portions of the
tax code drafted with sufficient clarity to provide direct notice
to taxpayers, most tax provisions are sufficiently complex that
the effective audiences are tax professionals and certified
preparers who assist them. This means that where taxpayers
place good-faith reliance on the advice of such influential inter-
preters, their subsequent mistakes of law are forgiven for all
but the most straightforward requirements.2 1 4
This stands in stark contrast with the interpretation of
most criminal laws-as in Marrero-where mistaken but good-
faith reliance on influential intermediaries was no excuse for
noncompliance. Without a nuanced understanding of statu-
tory audience, the distinction between the treatment of gener-
ally applicable tax and criminal laws may seem somewhat
arbitrary, for statutory compliance obligations would seem to
fall on members of the public in both instances, and yet the
consequences for mistaken reliance and noncompliance are
quite different.
My argument is that the distinction in treatment may be
justified in part by the different first-order audiences of these
statutes. The primary audience for many criminal statutes is
the public at large, and many criminal statutes are drafted
such that their provisions apply directly to the conduct of ordi-
nary individuals without elaboration. By contrast, many por-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code are highly technical
provisions drafted primarily for official interpreters such as the
Internal Revenue Service, whom drafters expect will implement
tax laws through textually specific and clear regulatory gui-
dance. Many portions of the Code have direct application but
are also sufficiently complex that taxpayers may be reasonably
expected to employ the services of tax attorneys and account-
ants to assist in compliance. Given this more dynamic and
complex statutory realm, it may be more reasonable to expect
that lay audiences can rely on influential interpreters like ac-
countants and tax attorneys.
213 Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
214 The U.S. Tax Court has identified a three-part test for the tax adviser
exception, requiring that the taxpayer (1) turned to a competent professional with
sufficient expertise; (2) provide necessary and accurate information to the adviser;
and (3) actually rely in good faith on the advisor's judgment. See Neonatology
Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 43, 99 (2000), affd, 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.
2002).
186 [Vol. 105:137
THE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
D. Official and (Un)official Audiences
Perhaps the most important first-order audiences of stat-
utes are government officials. The law often designates to regu-
latory agencies like the IRS an "official" interpreter status, and
both state and federal laws deem certain officials to be the
authoritative interpreters of relevant bodies of law that fall
under their jurisdiction. In the criminal law domain, these may
include law enforcement agencies who, for prosecutorial pur-
poses, decide whether particular conduct falls within statutory
prohibitions, as well as state and federal prosecutors, who will
sometimes clarify how criminal prohibitions are to be under-
stood and broadly applied.2 15 More commonly, official inter-
preters abound in federal administrative law. They include
agencies entitled to "Chevron" deference21 6 because they have
been delegated law-making authority by Congress to engage in
legislative rulemaking with the effect of law.2 1 7 Peter Strauss
has called this the "Chevron space": the area within which Con-
gress has statutorily empowered the agency to act in a manner
that creates obligations or constraints that carry legal force
derived from the statute.2 18
Agency deference is often approached in terms of questions
about separation of powers and the non-delegation of lawmak-
ing power.2 19 Yet I will argue they also raise interesting ques-
tions of statutory audience, in part because agencies interpret
statutes in many kinds of actions beyond the rulemaking and
binding adjudications that formally warrant Chevron defer-
ence: these include interpretative rules, enforcement guide-
lines, policy manuals, opinion letters, no-action letters, and
agency guidance, among others.220 In theory, where Congress
has not delegated lawmaking authority to the agency, less def-
erential "Skidmore weight" applies,221 and so agency interpre-
215 See DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STrH & WILLIAM J. STuNTz, DEFINING FEDERAL
CRIMEs ch. 12 (Delegating Criminal Lawmaking) (2d ed. 2014).
216 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
217 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001). For an excel-
lent overview of the domains for which first-order official interpretations warrant
Chevron deference, and when they should not, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 889-99 (2001).
218 Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron
Space" and "Skidmore Weight" 112 CoLuM. L. REv. 1143, 1145 (2012).
219 E.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1187 (2016).
220 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Merrill & Hick-
man, supra note 217, at 886.
221 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 547,
552 (2000) ("[Ain interpretative rule is only a statement of the agency's present
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tations rendered in these more informal documents are not
entitled to Chevron deference.222
In practice, informal or (un)official interpretations such as
agency guidance nevertheless have a significant effect on how
other first-order statutory audiences act to conform their con-
duct to law,2 2 3 particularly given that such official interpretive
positions may effectively govern the field for years or even de-
cades unless and until a court is called upon to review a legal
challenge to the agency's interpretation. Such (un)official in-
terpretive authority sometimes even extends to self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), to whom federal agencies delegate en-
forcement powers. These SROs have enforcement power over
their own members' statutory and regulatory compliance, a
practice Emily Hammond has described as leading to "double
deference" because the agency itself often defers to the inter-
pretations of the SRO.2 2 4 Framed in terms of statutory audi-
ence, such practices may be defensible in circumstances in
which the non-agency audiences of the statute really do under-
stand the regulatory terrain as well as, or better than, the
agency itself.
1. Unique Interpretive Concerns for Officicd and
(Un)official Audiences
Framing questions of administrative law and interpretation
in terms of statutory audience also helps to reveal the impor-
tant linkages between statutory audience and interpretive
method. First, as Ed Rubin has explained, legislative delega-
tions to administrative agencies often serve to provide broad,
intransitive statutory instructions to develop clear and con-
crete rules, rather than the precise rules themselves.225 In-
deed, this intransitivity is one of the primary justifications for
interpretation of the statute ... [and] the Supreme Court made it clear that an
interpretative rule has no 'power to control.'"); see also Strauss, supra note 218,
at 1145-46 (describing Skidmore "weight" as the weight that an agency's view on a
statutory question should have on the courts, which retain ultimate interpretive
authority).
222 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30: see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 217, at
901.
223 See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL AGENCY
GUIDANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 35 (2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GRK7-4WJM].
224 See Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM.
L. REv. 1705, 1711 (2016).
225 Rubin, supra note 70, at 381.
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Chevron deference in the first place.2 2 6 Within this "Chevron
space," Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule have described
how broad authorizing statutes often do not have "a single best
interpretation"; instead, interpretation typically involves
agency choice within a policy space defined by the range of the
statute's reasonable interpretations.2 2 7
Second, Congress often gives important signals to an
agency through the legislative drafting process. Extratextual
evidence provided in the legislative history of the statute may
therefore be especially useful for the agency tasked with imple-
menting and interpreting the law. For intransitive administra-
tive statutes, agencies rarely make regulatory choices on the
basis of an interpretation of the semantic meaning of the text
alone. In determining Congress's ambition behind an ambigu-
ous instruction, the agency would almost certainly begin by
examining sources of contextual meaning such as the legisla-
tive history.228 As Peter Strauss has noted, "[1]egislative history
has a centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might
not readily be conceived by persons who are outside govern-
ment."2 2 9 Congressional drafters often interface directly with
agencies in the course of drafting the laws the agencies will be
authorized to enforce,230 including the production of materials
that constitute the statute's legislative history.2 3 1 Post-enact-
ment, agencies are staffed with both legal and policy experts
who have the time and expertise to undergo such research
before acting.232
Sophisticated official audiences may also be better suited
to consider how a given statutory provision compares to others
in related federal statutes. Both the Department of Justice and
226 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 206 (2006)
(arguing that Chevron deference recognizes that "interpretation of unclear terms
cannot operate without some judgments by the interpreter," as well as the need
for "discretionary judgments to be made by appropriate institutions"-the
agencies).
227 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032, 1045 (2011).
228 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 329.
229 I
230 See generally Bressman & Gluck, supra note 8, at 767-69 (describing how
legislative drafters are primarily in interpretive conversations with agencies, not
courts).
231 Jarrod Shobe, Agency Legislative History, 68 EMORY L.J. 283, 296-97
(2018); Strauss, supra note 10, at 347.
232 See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Pol-
icy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 823 (1990) ("Chevron's importance is its recogni-
tion that, expertise aside, the agencies, nevertheless, maintain a comparative
institutional advantage over the judiciary in interpreting ambiguous legislation
that the agencies are charged with applying.").
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regulatory agencies are "repeat player[s] in interpretive litiga-
tion involving major regulatory statutes," and these audiences
generally "have the resources and incentives to compile similar
information on all of the major statutes they implement."2 3 3 As
a result, cross-referencing other statutory schemes, or relying
on related administrative guidance and precedents, may be
more appropriate in implementing an administrative statute
that is part of the larger regulatory landscape. Unlike most
other statutory audiences, agency officials have "a direct rela-
tionship with Congress," which provides them with "insights
into legislative purposes and meaning that are likely to be
much more sure-footed than those available to courts in epi-
sodic litigation."2 3 4
Thus, when courts review the interpretations of such offi-
cial interpreters, it would seem especially appropriate that they
draw on the same resources that Congress often expects the
agencies to rely on. This is one rationale for Chevron defer-
ence,23 5 and it is also borne out in judicial practice. Bill Es-
kridge and Lauren Baer have identified that the Supreme Court
relies on legislative history more often in Chevron cases than in
non-Chevron cases, which is not surprising given the relatively
greater weight agencies place on legislative history in develop-
ing their own interpretations and understandings of statutory
meaning.236
Nevertheless, the origin of legislative history as an interpre-
tive method cautions against its unvarnished application for
statutes directed at all audiences, for its initial development as
an interpretive method was motivated by its strategic advan-
tage for particular government audiences. Nicholas Parrillo
has documented how legislative history as a method of inter-
pretation arose in the wake of the newly expanded New Deal
administrative state, which was "vested with unprecedented
capability to process and analyze congressional discourse and
translate it into legal argument."23 7 Given federal agencies'
unequalled access and resources, Parrillo has concluded that
233 Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L.
REv. 209, 273 (2015).
234 Mashaw, supra note 10, at 511.
235 Magill & Vermuele, supra note 227, at 1045.
236 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1135-36 (2008).
237 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administra-
tive State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE
L.J. 266, 315 (2013).
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"[legislative history was therefore a statist tool of interpreta-
tion, in the sense that the administrative state enjoyed privi-
leged access to such material and was a privileged provider of it
to the Court, more than was true of other interpretive sources,
such as statutory text."2 3 8
However, agency insiders did not long remain the sole ben-
eficiaries of legislative history. Because of the "peculiar open-
ness of the legislative process in America," Parrillo has noted
that judicial reliance on legislative history also privileged "law-
yer-lobbyists above the general population of lawyers" (let alone
other audiences).239 These lawyers entered and exited the "re-
volving door" between law firms, lobbying firms, and govern-
ment, and after World War II "created a new kind of law firm-
the 'Washington law firm'-staffed by veterans of the adminis-
trative state and dedicated to constant lobbying of that state
and of Congress."24 0 Unsurprisingly, industry and trade as-
sociations and the Washington law firms they hire are the chief
antagonists of the agencies and their frequent sparring part-
ners in litigation. While the playing field has since become
more (though not entirely) level, this history demonstrates pre-
cisely why normative questions of statutory audience and in-
terpretive methods questions must be evaluated side by side,
for some methods of interpretation may be more advantageous
for some audiences at the expense of others.
2. Notice from (and Comment on) Regulatory Statutes
When interpreting statutes whose audiences are primarily
agency officials, notice considerations in interpretation may
also shift in important ways. In particular, the normative sig-
nificance of semantic, notice-based canons and methods such
as evidence of ordinary usage, the plain meaning rule, and
basic grammar canons of construction may be of lesser impor-
tance when the statutory text alone is unlikely to be the princi-
pal form of legal notice for the audiences in question. This is
because concerns about notice and reliance are often more
appropriately evaluated as part of the administrative rulemak-
ing process, rather than on the basis of the statutory text
alone.24 1 For many administrative statutes whose primary
238 Id. at 367.
239 Id. at 368.
240 Id.
241 Indeed, it is often forgotten that Chevron itself concerned an agency's shift-
ing interpretation of a statute that contravened its own prior interpretation of that
statute. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
857-58 (1984). For the interpretation of agency rules and regulations, the Court
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audiences include both federal agencies and the industries
they regulate, all parties may be reasonably expected to draw
on more obscure extratextual sources of interpretation such as
inferences from legislative history and related statutory usages.
Moreover, such audiences are often actively involved in the
dynamic rulemaking and guidance-development interpretive
process that serves to furnish notice as to agency interpretive
choices about statutory meaning.
Recognition of these audience-specific interpretive condi-
tions might provide courts with a more principled rationale for
prioritizing legislative history over evidence of ordinary usage, a
practice the Court has often struggled to justify even in circum-
stances where imposing the ordinary meaning of a term would
lead to bizarre results. The Court confronted just such a prob-
lem in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,2 42
in which the Court addressed whether, for the purposes of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the ABA's Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary had been an advisory commit-
tee "utilized" by the Reagan White House when the committee
provided the White House advice concerning potential judicial
nominees.243
Congress passed FACA to ensure both Congress and the
public could remain appraised of the existence and activities of
numerous groups that served "to advise officers and agencies
in the executive branch."2 44 To this end, FACA mandates re-
porting requirements for any "advisory committee" "established
or utilized by the President."2 4 5 While Congress and the public
at large are certainly one indirect audience of FACA, the princi-
pal audiences who must conform their conduct to the statute
include the President, executive branch agencies, and statuto-
rily defined advisory committees, as well as the plaintiffs-in-
interest likely to sue to enforce FACA, primarily well-funded
D.C. watchdog groups.246
has recently reemphasized that unfair surprise and reliance interests are among
the chief normative considerations in deciding whether to defer to the agency's
interpretation of its own work product, in part because such interpretations are
not always developed through standard rulemaking channels. See Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019).
242 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
243 Id. at 443.
244 Id. at 445-46 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
245 5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 3 (2012) (emphasis added).
246 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 447-48 (identifying plaintiff-appellants as the
Washington Legal Foundation and Public Citizen).
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TABLE 5: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCES OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITrEE AcT
Audiences Relevant Relevant Statutory Text
Provision
Watchdog Groups, 5 U.S.C. "(2) The term "advisory committee" means
Advisory app. 2 § 3 any committee, board, commission, council,
Committees, conference, panel, task force, or other
Agencies, and the similar group, or any subcommittee or other
President subgroup thereof... , established or
utilized by the President, or established or
utilized by one or more federal agencies."
From the standpoint of notice, defining "utilize" according
to its "plain" meaning or most "ordinary" usage would not nec-
essarily clarify which groups were required to comply with the
statute, given the statute's more sophisticated audience, and
the lack of direct consequences for members of the general
public. Yet because the Supreme Court tends to employ a one-
size-fits-all approach to interpretation, it struggled to justify its
disinclination to give "utilize" that word's most straightforward
meaning. If it did, the ABA committee, as well as countless
other organizations, would be required to comply with the open
meeting transparency requirements, which would subject the
President's Article II judicial nominations process to unusual,
and possibly unconstitutional, transparency.
The Court, in a majority opinion penned by Justice William
Brennan, acknowledged that while there was "no doubt" that
the Executive "utilizes" the ABA Committee "in one common
sense of the term,"2 4 7 "reliance on the plain language of FACA
alone [wals not entirely satisfactory," since a "literal reading" of
the term would compel an "odd result"2 48 : the President's Arti-
cle II power to nominate federal judges would be constricted in
a manner that might raise significant constitutional con-
cerns.2 4 9 Instead, Justice Brennan "search[ed] for other evi-
dence" "beyond the naked text" and considered the purpose
and legislative history of FACA, 250 finding that Congress had
intended FACA to cover only advisory groups established by the
Executive Branch and not groups simply utilized by it.2 5 1 In-
247 Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248 Id. at 452, 454 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
249 Id. at 466.
250 Id. at 454-55.
251 Id. at 461-63.
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terpreted in this narrower fashion, Justice Brennan concluded
that FACA did not apply to the ABA committee.2 5 2
However, as Justice Anthony Kennedy noted in a concur-
rence, the "odd result" of FACA's broader application was
hardly akin to the usual settings in which the absurd results
canon is applied.25 3 The "absurd results" canon is most appro-
priately used2 54-and in practice is generally used25 5-where
the audience of the statute is laypeople and where attribution
of the ordinary meaning of a term in a criminal prohibition
would lead to an egregiously punitive result. In this sense, the
absurd results canon functions as a textual corollary of the
rule of lenity. In cases where the plain meaning rule might
result in a significant disadvantage to members of the general
public, courts should consider contextual content beyond the
plain text. For FACA, Justice Kennedy contended that the
plain language of the statute was the "ready starting point,
which ought to serve also as a sufficient stopping point," be-
cause nothing more was needed to be known than the plain
meaning of "utilize."2 56
Yet recognition of the particular statutory audiences of
FACA provides a more defensible justification than Justice
Brennan's for looking beyond the ordinary meaning. This ap-
proach also explains why Justice Kennedy's "sufficient stop-
ping point" analysis may be insufficient for understanding
what the statute seeks to convey, and to whom. Where stat-
utes are directed at agencies and sophisticated interest groups,
objections to reliance on contextual evidence like legislative
history are weaker. This is so even where the extratextual evi-
dence suggests a meaning different from the "plain" meaning
associated with the "ordinary" usage of the term. In Public
Citizen, the legislative history of FACA concretely demonstrated
that Congress did not intend such a broad meaning of "utilize."
As Victoria Nourse has subsequently and persuasively shown,
Congress's own rules required rejection of the broader applica-
tion of FACA, given that the term "utilize" had been added to
252 Id. at 464-65.
253 Id. at 470-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
254 See SCADA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 234-39 ("Absurdity Doctrine").
255 Every one of Justice Kennedy's examples of appropriate applications of the
"absurd result[s]" canon involves criminal prohibitions or penalties whose audi-
ence is the general public. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-71 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (listing cases).
256 Id. at 469.
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the bill at a point at which substantive changes to legislation
were no longer permitted under congressional rules.2 5 7
Nourse is correct in suggesting that recognition of Con-
gress's rules would "simplify the process of analyzing and iden-
tifying relevant legislative history"25 8-assuming it is always
appropriate to enrich the statutory text with knowledge about
its enactment history. Public Citizen shows how even second-
orderjudicial audiences can get that inquiry wrong: if even nine
Justices on the Supreme Court were unaware of how Con-
gress's own rules could signal the importance of particular as-
pects of the legislative history, one might reasonably question
whether such legislative history would simplify the interpretive
inquiry for less sophisticated statutory audiences in other
circumstances.
Notably, textualists such as Seventh Circuit Judge Amy
Coney Barrett have critiqued that approach on related
grounds, objecting that it "privilege[s] the legislative perspective
by adopting a strained usage that complies with congressional
conventions that do not map onto ordinary uses of English."259
But such an inquiry may be appropriate if the statutory audi-
ences are not "ordinary use[rs] of English,"2 60 but rather execu-
tive branch agencies and sophisticated D.C. interest groups. In
those circumstances, the textualist objection may be less
trenchant, because it is not "ordinary use[r]s of English" in-
volved in implementing the statute.
E. Judicial First-Order Audiences
In addition to ordinary, influential, and official interpret-
ers, judges are themselves ometimes first-order statutory in-
terpreters, deciding on the meaning and application of statutes
in the first instance. This is because some statutory provisions
regulate court-specific activities such as the admissibility of
evidence, the exercise of judicial discretion in case manage-
ment, as well as the exercise of federal common-law lawmak-
ing. These provisions are often addressed directly to judges,
who are often given broad discretion in their application.
Because judges are repeat players in interpreting these
provisions, unique interpretive considerations may apply.
257 Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory ofStatutory Interpretatiore Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 92-97 (2012).
258 Id. at 75.
259 Barrett, supra note 169, at 2207-08.
260 Id. at 2208.
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Among these is the presumption of consistent usage.261 One
manifestation of this presumption, the "whole code" (or "record
of statutory usage") canon,262 instructs that the use and mean-
ing of an ambiguous term in one statute can be derived from
the meaning of the term as it is used elsewhere in the federal
code. The rationale behind this is that "statutory terms should
bear consistent meaning across the U.S. Code as a whole."263
A weaker but more common version of this presumption is the
"whole-text" canon that assumes a term used in multiple
places in the same statute should be given the same
meaning.264
The problem with these canons is that they rarely capture
statutory meaning as intended by its drafters.26 5 For one
thing, the presumption is empirically questionable, at best:
interviews with numerous legislative drafters have revealed
that few find "whole code" analysis to be a useful way of dis-
cerning the legislative purpose behind a particular term or
phrase.266 Indeed, even the more modest "whole act" canon
often reflects neither actual drafting practices nor legislative
expectations for a given statute's meaning, especially for onni-
bus legislation whose parts are drafted by different subcommit-
tees.267 As others have noted, imposing rules of consistency on
text-a mode of interpretation more prominent among textual-
ists-"shapes and changes the [U.S.] Code as much as the
[purposivist] judges-as-legislative-partner model."268 Judicial
261 See SCALiA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 170-73 ("Presumption of Consis-
tent Usage"). Although this presumption generally applies within statutes and
"can hardly be said to apply across the whole corpus jurts," Scalia and Garner
acknowledge that "the more connection the cited statute has with the statute
under consideration, the more plausible the argument becomes." Moreover, if it
"deal[s] with the same subject, the argument could even be persuasive." Id. at
172-73.
262 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991).
263 Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Prob-
len in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REv. 859, 874 (2012).
264 See SCALiA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 167-69.
265 See Buzbee, supra note 57, at 189-94 (arguing that the presumption of
consistent usage across statutes is premised on the faulty "one-Congress fiction"
of a single knowledgeable author aware of semantic usage in all prior related
legislative enactments).
266 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 8, at 936 ("[OInly 9% of [legislative drafter]
respondents told us that drafters often or always intend for terms to apply con-
sistently across statutes that are unrelated by subject matter.").
267 Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 807, 858-59 (2014) (noting that omnibus
bills in particular are often the result of a "conglomeration" of bills drafted by
different legislative staffs and committees and then combined together).
268 Gluck, The Failure of Formalism, supra note 24, at 187.
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use of consistent usage canons, then, cannot easily be justified
on faithful agency grounds.
The consistent usage canon also falls short of rule-of-law
norms like notice, especially for statutory audiences uch as
the general public. It is difficult to imagine how the consistent
usage presumption enhances the likelihood that a given stat-
ute communicates to its relevant audience(s), for a systematic
search of linguistic usage across the entirety of the U.S. Code
would be epistemically burdensome as an a priori matter. How
many members of the public (or even their lawyers) are likely to
begin their quest to understand a given statutory term or
phrase by comparing its usage across every other federal stat-
ute? Moreover, even influential intermediaries tend to be ex-
perts in one area of law, not in linguistic usage across all laws.
Short of legislating an imposed and uniform U.S. Code defini-
tion of a common term in the Dictionary Act2 69-a task for
Congress, not the courts-it seems improbable that the consis-
tent usage canon would help lay first-order interpreters seek-
ing to resolve statutory ambiguity.
Instead, the consistent usage canon is better explained as
a judicially imposed uniformity of meaning for recurring provi-
sions that appear across many different substantive statutes.
In such circumstances, the statutory audience who benefits
most is often judges. Consider, for example, the attorney's fee-
shifting provisions contained in many substantively distinct
federal statutes, including the Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act, as described in subpart II.A above, and discussed
in subpart III.C below.
TABLE 6: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF FEDERAL FEE-SHIFFING
PROVISIONS
Audience Relevant Relevant Statutory Text
Provision
Courts 42 U.S.C. "[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
§ 1988 prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
These fee-shifting provisions alter the "American Rule" de-
fault that attorneys' fees cannot ordinarily be recovered by the
prevailing party in litigation,27 0 and instead grant trial courts
the discretion to award such fees at the close of litigation. A
269 See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012).




primary (though not exclusive) audience for such provisions is
judges, for they have the sole discretion to act under the stat-
ute to shift attorneys' fees. And unlike attorneys who generally
specialize in one area of law that may involve a statutory fee-
shifting provision, judges are likely to be the only legal actors
who regularly encounter these provisions across many different
statutory schemes. For a recurring provision whose audience
is primarily judges, it may be desirable that such a provision
convey a consistent meaning across the many substantively
varied statutory contexts in which judges are likely to encoun-
ter them.
This approach seems to explain, at least in part, why
judges will sometimes prioritize the consistent usage canon
over other interpretive sources or canons, as Justice Scalia's
majority opinion did in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.
v. Casey.2 71 For textualists, Casey is a demonstration of Jus-
tice Scalia's textualism favoring "coherent congressional usage
over coherent congressional policy in determining which ele-
ments of context to treat as determinative."2 7 2 Yet that expla-
nation, on its own, does not provide an adequate account of
why judges should care more about coherent usage over coher-
ent policy generally, let alone in any particular case. Most stat-
utory interpretation cases concern an ambiguous term, after
all, and yet no member of the Court-Justice Scalia in-
cluded2 73-has regularly and systematically subjected every
ambiguous term in a statute to whole code analysis. Courts'
(knowingly unrealistic) demand for coherent congressional us-
age over coherent congressional policy may be most justified
when a particular audience is a repeat player, engaging with
271 499 U.S. 83 (1991). Scalia counted no fewer than thirty-four statutes
enacted before, simultaneously to, or after the fee-shifting provision in question in
42 U.S.C. § 1988, each of which explicitly granted judges the discretion to award
expert witness fees in addition to a reasonable attorney's fee. Id. at 84. On this
basis, Justice Scalia inferred that the default legal meaning of the term "attorney's
fee" did not include expert witness fees, for reading § 1988's fee-shifting provision
to include expert fees would render "dozens of statutes referring to the two sepa-
rately . . . an inexplicable exercise in redundancy." Id. at 92. Justice Scalia
reached this conclusion despite evidence in the legislative history, identified by
the dissent, that strongly suggested Congress intended for the attorney's fee
award to include expert witness fees. See id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 94 (2006).
273 See Gluck, The Failure of Formalism, supra note 24, at 185-86 (noting
Justice Scalia's abandonment of the presumption of consistent usage in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)). Justice Scalia himself
had deemed it a "fiction" that "the enacting legislature was aware of [terminologi-
cal meaning in] all those other laws." ScAmA, supra note 33, at 16.
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the same term of art across many different substantive
statutes.
III
THE MULTIPLE AUDIENCES OF STATUTES
As the prior Part has demonstrated, examining statutory
interpretation decision-making from the standpoint of statu-
tory audiences not only helps to explain why judges invoke
different substantive legal canons, but also sheds light on the
appropriate relationship between audiences, substantive ca-
nons, and interpretive methods. While most of the statutory
provisions revisited in Part II had fairly straightforward princi-
pal audiences, some statutes contain particular provisions
that, read on their own, might suggest one audience, but when
read in context of the larger statute, are better understood as
addressing a more particular audience. Textual and contex-
tual clues contained in a statute, coupled with the way the
legislature has prescribed for its implementation, can often
help to clarify when that statute is actually addressed to a
narrower audience rather than a broader one.
Many statutes have multiple and very differently situated
audiences, particularly those statutes that contain both broad
regulatory mandates directed to the relevant implementing
agency as well as specific prohibitions and instructions ad-
dressed directly to the audiences to be regulated. This Part
revisits several canonical statutory interpretation cases to
identify how drawing explicit attention to statutory audience
can help to clarify statutory meaning. It also shows how ca-
nonical cases in statutory interpretation that are typically
taught as debates about interpretive methods can also be un-
derstood as debates about the appropriate audience lens
through which to interpret the statute.
A. Identifying the Principal Audience
Being attentive to statutory audience can help to clarify
when a statutory term should be given its broadest permissible
ordinary meaning, or a more specific and narrower meaning
appropriate to the principal audience of the statute in question.
In particular, where the statutory scheme primarily addresses
a particular subset of the general population, there are good
reasons to doubt that a term contained therein should always
be given its broadest permissible meaning.
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Consider Yates v. United States,2 7 4 a recent instant classic
of statutory interpretation. In Yates, the Supreme Court ex-
amined whether a fish was a "tangible object" whose destruc-
tion was prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's prohibition on
the destruction of evidence intended to "impede, obstruct, or
influence" a federal investigation.2 75 The defendant in Yates, a
commercial fisherman, had been caught offshore by the Coast
Guard with several dozen slightly undersized deep-sea fish in
violation of federal fisheries law; Yates dumped the fish before
returning to harbor so as to avoid being assessed a penalty
back on shore.2 7 6 Yates was subsequently convicted of know-
ingly impeding a federal investigation by destroying the fish, in
violation of Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibition on the destruction of
tangible objects.
At trial and on appeal, the defendant argued that the tangi-
ble object destruction prohibition should be read in light of its
passage as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 2 7 7 Sarbanes-Oxley
was enacted in the wake of the Enron Corporation's corporate
accounting scandal, which included systematic accounting
fraud as well as the destruction of numerous incriminating
financial documents related to the scandal. In Yates, the de-
fendant asserted that the retention of "tangible object[s]" sub-
ject to the statute were document-related objects uch as
computer hard drives and logbooks that were reasonably re-
lated to evidence of financial fraud, not every conceivable tangi-
ble object.2 7 8
In Yates, a majority of the Court sided with the defendant,
reversing his conviction.27 9 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
plurality, acknowledged that while the term "tangible object" as
a matter of pure signification could encompass an object such
as a fish, the legal meaning of the term was cabined both by the
linguistic context of the words surrounding it, 2 8 0 as well
as the legislative context, given its passage as part of
Sarbanes-Oxley.28 1 Writing for four dissenting Justices, Jus-
274 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
275 Id. at 1078; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802(a),
116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
276 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079-80.
277 Id. at 1079-80.
278 Id. at 1080.
279 Id. at 1088-89.
280 Applying the ejusdem generis and noscitur et sociis canons, the plurality
noted that the words immediately surrounding "tangible object" ("falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record [or) document") narrowed its meaning. Id. at
1085-87.
281 Id. at 1081.
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tice Elena Kagan countered that the term should mean the
same thing in Sarbanes-Oxley "as it means in everyday lan-
guage-any object capable of being touched."28 2 Although not
articulated as such, the core of the disagreement urned on the
principal audience of the statute: was the tangible-object de-
struction prohibition best understood narrowly, targeting audi-
tors and corporate officers involved in document management
and retention, or understood broadly, empowering law enforce-
ment officers to target every member of society and every tangi-
ble object?
The plurality chose the narrower interpretation, in part on
the basis of the more specific audience at which the statute was
directed. Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted to address financial
crimes, and so the audience that the statute seemed most
clearly intended to reach were corporate officers and audi-
tors,2 8 3 not commercial fishermen. Moreover, the plurality
noted that contextual clues throughout the statute supported
this narrower reading. The section containing the prohibition
was entitled, "Criminal Penalties for Altering Docurnents,"2 M
and the prohibition's heading indicated an audience of corpo-
rate officers and auditors involved in criminal fraud by means
of the "[d]estruction, alteration, or falsification of records."2 85
Moreover, although not mentioned by the plurality, but in sup-
port of its conclusion, the tangible object provision was part of
a subsidiary act incorporated into Sarbanes-Oxley and sepa-
rately subtitled the "Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accounta-
bility Act," further suggesting that the tangible object provision
was aimed at corporate fraud.28 6
Yates also reflects how contemporary lawyers' focus on the
U.S. Code can sometimes obscure evidence of distinctive statu-
tory audiences specific to the statute in question. Today, once
a federal statute is enacted into law, the Office of the Law
Revision Counsel transmutes Congress's enacted statute at
large into specific and segmented provisions of the U.S. Code;
282 Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
283 See Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, Legislated Ethics: From Enron
to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Impact on Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHIcS 31, 42, 45
(2005) (noting the primary focus of Sarbanes-Oxley was "regulating corporate
conduct in an attempt to promote ethical behavior and prevent the fraudulent
financial reporting" and that "[miuch of the legislation is aimed directly at senior
management").
284 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 802, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-20
(2012)) (emphasis added).




often left out altogether are important portions of the bill, such
as the legislative findings and purposes-which may help to
clarify the principal audience(s) the statute seeks to ad-
dress.28 7 As Sarbanes-Oxley was subsumed into the U.S.
Code,28 8 both the heading and the short title noted above dis-
appeared, along with the indication that the tangible-evidence-
destruction prohibition was contained within Sarbanes-Oxley,
a statute seeking to remedy white-collar criminal fraud.
TABLE 7: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
TITLE VIII-CORPORATE AND
CRIMINAL FRAUD ACCOUNTABILITY
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002".
SEC. 802. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ALTERING DOCUMENTS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 73 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
"§ 1519. Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records
in Federal investigations and bankruptcy
"Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation
of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, impris-
oned not more than 20 years, or both.
While most law students, lawyers, and even judges gener-
ally focus on the U.S. Code rather than the statutory text as
enacted, when members of Congress vote to enact a statute,
they vote on the session law, which contains the entire statu-
tory text (including headings, titles, and recitations of legisla-
tive findings and purpose).28 9 In the case of Yates, the tangible
evidence provision was not enacted simply to enhance neigh-
287 See Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L.
REv. 669, 673 (2019) [hereinafter Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings] (noting
that "it is common practice for a bill to be stripped of its findings and purposes
before the rest of the statute is placed in the main text of the US Code" and that
"findings and purposes are sometimes left out of the Code altogether").
288 See Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Records in Federal Investi-
gations and Bankruptcy, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
289 See Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings, supra note 287, at 691 (explain-
ing that once a bill is enacted, it is codified in the U.S. Code).
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boring sections of the U.S. Code, each of which criminalizes
particular acts tending to thwart federal investigations of all
kinds.290 Thus, while the dissent correctly noted that the tan-
gible-object destruction prohibition was among several other
federal evidence tampering prohibitions, there is good reason to
think that the statute's principal audience can be better identi-
fied from how the entire relevant provision in question was
enacted-in a bill directed chiefly at reducing corporate fraud
by elevating the regulatory and compliance requirements for
corporate officers and auditors, not in a statute seeking to en-
hance any and all kinds of law enforcement investigations.
Importantly, the statute's operation can also help to iden-
tify the principal audience whose behavior it seeks to regulate.
Sarbanes-Oxley requires regulated audiences to undergo com-
pliance training,29 1 and an entire cottage industry has emerged
to support corporate officers' ongoing compliance obliga-
tions.292 The Act also established a new agency, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which "en-
list[s] auditors to enforce existing laws against theft and fraud
by corporate officers."2 9 3 The PCAOB oversees corporate com-
pliance with Sarbanes-Oxley, issuing disciplinary or remedial
sanctions for parties who fail to conform to relevant storage
and disclosure requirements as a prophylactic measure to
ward off more significant financial fraud.294
The PCAOB's oversight in ensuring compliance with
Sarbanes-Oxley serves in part to furnish notice to the statute's
principal audiences as to the statute's relevant document re-
tention requirements.2 9 5 In this context, the tangible-docu-
ment destruction prohibition gives the compliance
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley teeth by criminalizing the act
that is much easier to prove-destruction of documents-than
290 See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10
GREEN BAG 2D 283, 283-84 (2007).
291 Rockness & Rockness, supra note 283, at 45.
292 See, e.g., SARBANEs OXLEY 101, https://www.sarbanes-oxley-101.com/
[https://perma.cc/Y9FN-2MR6] (last updated Nov. 9, 2019) (providing links to
Sarbanes-Oxley organizational compliance checklists, certifications and audit
materials, and downloads for compliance software).
293 John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (2007).
294 See Larry CatA Backer, Surveillance and ControL- Privatizing and Nationaliz-
ing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327,
397-402.
295 See Ashoke S. Talukdar, The Voice of Reason: The Corporate Compliance
Officer and the Regulated Corporate Environment, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 3 (2005)
(noting that "the importance of education and training programs in compliance
awareness is often reflected in the laws itself').
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the predicate act the statute seeks to prevent-fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting. From the standpoint of the rule-of-law norm
of statutory notice, Sarbanes-Oxley's compliance provisions
ensure that the principal audiences (corporate officers and au-
ditors) are aware of its document retention requirements, un-
like fishermen and other members of the general public who
are far less likely to be put on notice. Even the Department of
Justice itself recognized shortly after the statute was enacted
that the statute sought "new tools to hold white collar criminals
accountable."296
B. (Mis)identifying the Relevant Audience
Many other statutes, of course, have multiple principal
audiences, and interpretive tensions are especially likely to
arise where statutes address multiple and distinct statutory
audiences in the same provision. One such example is the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973. Section 9 of the Act makes
it an offense for "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" to "take any [endangered or threatened] species
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United
States."297 One first-order audience for this provision of the
ESA is quite literally any person. The penalties provision of the
ESA sets out a scheme of escalating civil and criminal penalties
from $500 to $50,000 depending on the nature of the violation
of the statutory provision (or any further regulation issued
under it), and up to a year's imprisonment.2 98
Yet the statutory provision addresses another first-order
audience: the several federal agencies delegated lawmaking au-
thority by Congress to promulgate regulations the prohibition
on, among other things, the taking of endangered species. The
ESA expressly delegates to the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior the authority to promulgate regulations pertaining
to threatened species, and makes violations of those regula-
tions equally subject to civil and criminal penalties.299 Covered
regulations include those designating endangered and
threatened species and the habitats critical to their survival.30 0
296 Memorandum on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 from the Attorney Gen-
eral to the Director, FBI, Director, Exec. Off. of U.S. Attorneys, all U.S. Attorneys,
and all Special-Agents-in-Charge (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.Justice.gov/
archives/ag/attorney-general-august-1-2002-memorandum-sarbanes-oxley-act-
2002 [https://perma.cc/NA9-GUYA] (emphasis added).
297 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018).
298 Id. § 1540(a)(1), (b)(1).
299 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(G).
300 Id. § 1533(a)(1)-(3).
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The statute therefore includes both a transitive criminal prohi-
bition directed at "any person" as well as an intransitive in-
struction to the agency to promulgate regulations elaborating
on the extent of those prohibitions.
On the basis of its delegated power to promulgate regula-
tion related to takings, the agency defined by regulation that a
taking could include acts that kill or injure wildlife, including
"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or shelter-
ing."30 By concluding that habitat degradation was a chief
way to harm endangered species, the agency essentially pro-
hibited certain incidental takings of land which is the essential
habitat for survival of endangered species.
Complicating interpretation of the statute is the fact that it
was subsequently amended in 1982 to establish a permitting
scheme that would exempt covered parties from the agency's
regulatorily-defined incidental takings definition of the taking
prohibition, provided such parties put in place an agency-ap-
proved conservation plan that mitigates potential harm result-
ing from the transformation of lands containing critical habitat
to covered species.3 0 2 The amended version of the statute was
thus not only directed at the public at large, but also at a more
specific subset of the public: landowners seeking to obtain af-
firmative permission from the agency to transform property
designated by agency regulation-not by the statute itself-as
critical habitat.
301 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
302 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2019).
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TABLE 8: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCES OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(PosT-1982 AMENDMENTS) 3 0 3
Audience Relevant
Provision







U.S.C. § 1540 (b)(1)
50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(1994)
("Definitions")
(2) The Secretary Sec. 10(a)(B),
of the codified at 16













"[I]t is unlawful for any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States
to . .. take any [endangered] species
within the United States."
"Any person who knowingly violates any
provision of this chapter, of any pennit
or certificate issued hereunder, or of
any regulation issued in order to
implement [relevant] subsection[s] ...
shall, upon conviction, be fined not
more than $50,000 or imprisoned for
not more than one year, or both."
"Harm in the definition of 'take' in the
Act means an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering."
"The Secretary may permit, under such
terms and conditions as he shall
prescribe, ... any taking otherwise
prohibited by section 9(a)(1)(B) if such
taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity."
"No permit may be issued ... unless
the applicant therefor submit to the
Secretary a conservation plan that
specifies . .. the impact which will
likely result from such a taking [and]
what steps the applicant will take to
minimize or mitigate such impacts..."
These excerpts of the ESA nicely capture how a single stat-
utory provision can contain both transitive and intransitive
components that may lead to interpretive confusion, because
such a provision addresses multiple kinds of statutory audi-
ences at once, and anticipates different kinds of audience en-
gagement with the very same statutory language. This tension
was a central, though unappreciated, feature of the well-known
case of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
303 Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
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Great Oregon.3 0 4 Sweet Home concerned the aforementioned
regulation promulgated under the ESA that defined significant
habitat modification or degradation that killed or injured en-
dangered species, including on private land, as a violation of
the takings prohibition under the ESA.3 05
The regulation sparked controversy because the statute
itself lacked any direct prohibition on habitat modification or
degradation, and so to justify the agency's authority to regulate
private lands, the Secretary relied on a logical syllogism that
seemed to reach beyond the mere ordinary meaning of the term
"take."3 0 6 Because the Act elsewhere defines "take" to "mean[ I
to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect,"3 0 7 the agency promulgated the regulation in
furtherance of the subdefinition of take as prohibiting harm to
endangered species. On this basis, the agency determined that
substantial habitat modification or degradation that signifi-
cantly impaired breeding, feeding, or sheltering any of the cov-
ered species caused them significant harm, and therefore
constituted a "tak[ing]."308
Plaintiffs in Sweet Home were concerned that the regula-
tion could allow the taking prohibition to apply to the develop-
ment or alteration of private property containing critical
habitat for several threatened and endangered species of birds.
The legal consequence was that landowners would be pre-
vented from cutting down forest land on their own private prop-
erty, unless they either risked civil and/or criminal penalties
for violating the harm prohibition as defined by the regulation,
or else sought and received a permit exempting them from the
incidental takings prohibition.3 09 Landowners, logging compa-
nies, and "families dependent on the forest products indus-
tries" challenged the rule.3 10 The landowners contended that
the agency lacked the authority to promulgate it, for logging
privately owned forest land could not constitute a "taking" of
endangered species where the trees in question did not, at the
time of the logging activity, contain any such species.3 1 1
304 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
305 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2018) ("Harm in the definition of'take' in the Act ...
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, includ-
ing breeding, feeding or sheltering.").
306 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690.
307 Id. at 691 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19)) (emphasis added).
308 Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
309 Id. at 692.
310 JCL
311 Id. at 696.
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1. Judicial Disagreement About the Relevant Audience
What is striking about the written opinions in Sweet Home
is just how differently the majority and dissent seem to con-
ceive of the primary audiences of the ESA, a difference appar-
ent from the opening sentences of each opinion. Writing for the
majority, Justice John Paul Stevens commenced his discus-
sion by focusing on the Department and the Secretary: "[tihis
case presents the question [of] whether the Secretary exceeded
his authority under the Act by promulgating that regula-
tion."3 12 Justice Stevens's opinion repeatedly invoked the
framework of Chevron deference: because Congress did not
unambiguously manifest its intent in legislating the term
"take," the majority determined that at Chevron Step Two, the
Court "oweld] some degree of deference to the Secretary's rea-
sonable interpretation" and upheld the regulation.3 13 For Jus-
tice Stevens, the primary statutory audience was the Secretary,
and so the relevant question was whether Congress's directions
to the agency were sufficiently ambiguous and, if so, whether
the agency statutory audience had reasonably interpreted the
statutory instruction.3 14
It seems rather clear that not all Justices were focused on
the same audience Justice Stevens was. Indeed, Justice
Scalia, writing on behalf of three dissenting Justices, seemed to
emphasize his disagreement about the relevant statutory audi-
ence in the opening paragraph of his dissent. Justice Scalia's
concern was the "financial ruin" the regulation could have on
"the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national
zoological use."3 15 Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent emphasized
in its second paragraph the very broad audience of the ESA's
take prohibition: "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States."3 16 He also observed that the agency's definition
of "take" could sweep up a vast range of daily practices for
those involved: "farming, ranching, roadbuilding, construction
and logging" could all constitute prohibited conduct under the
regulation, "no matter how remote the chain of causation and
no matter how difficult to foresee (or to disprove) the
'injury'."3 1 7
312 Id at 690.
313 Id. at 703.
314 Id. at 691-92 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
315 Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316 Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
317 Id. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)).
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Framed in this way, Justice Scalia's dissent is most power-
ful in its emphasis on how difficult it might be for members of
the public to understand or foresee how their daily practices
could be implicated by the ESA. This approach calls to the fore
considerations of notice and intent usually more relevant for
the interpretation of criminal statutes directed at laypeople
than complex environmental statutes directed at administra-
tive agencies. Herein lies the tension: the ESA provision in
question functioned as both-a transitive direct criminal prohi-
bition applicable to members of the public, and an intransitive
and broad delegation of rulemaking to the agency. (Justice
Stevens acknowledged as much in a buried, but important
footnote on the rule of lenity's potential application to adminis-
trative regulations that interpret statutes implicating criminal
prohibitions. 318)
Given the seeming disagreement between the majority and
dissent about which audience to focus on, it is not surprising
that each opinion also emphasized different methods of statu-
tory interpretation, each more appropriate for the audience
they seemed to have in mind. Justice Scalia appeared to read
the statute through the lens of a "simple farmer" layperson,
and the interpretive approach he emphasized largely seemed
congruent with such an audience. While Justice Scalia briefly
engaged with the legislative history (if only in an effort to refute
the majority's use of it, and with his usual disclaimers),3 19 his
opinion relied much more heavily on semantic and syntactic
canons like noscitur a sociis3 2 0 and the ordinary meaning and
dictionary definitions of "take"32 1 and "harm."3 22 Emphasizing
the importance of attributing the ordinary usage of the term
"take"-especially significant where the statutory audience is
laypeople-Justice Scalia criticized the majority's "tempting
fallacy" of concluding that 'take' means 'harm,' which means
'impair breeding' such "that once defined, 'take' loses any sig-
nificance, and it is only the [cross-]definition that matters."3 23
By contrast, Justice Stevens largely drew on methods of
interpretation especially appropriate for an administrative
agency audience. His majority opinion did not once consult a
318 Id. at 691 n.18 (majority opinion).
319 Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even if legislative history were a legiti-
mate and reliable tool of interpretation (which I shall assume in order to rebut the
Court's claim) . . . .
320 Id. at 720-21.
321 Id. at 717.
322 Id. at 719.
323 Id. at 718.
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dictionary definition for the ordinary usage of the term "take": it
was enough that Congress provided a specific statutory cross-
definition of the term.3 2 4 Because the ESA directs the Secre-
tary to enforce the statute with the force of law, Justice Stevens
concluded that the term "take" was sufficiently ambiguous at
Chevron Step One. At Step Two, Justice Stevens concluded
that deference was warranted to the agency after consulting
the legislative history of the ESA and employing the "whole
text" and "presumption against ineffectiveness" canons, ap-
proaches which are much more appropriate for administrative
audiences seeking tools to implement a relatively open-ended
and intransitive legislative instruction. Thus, much as the
agency did, Justice Stevens focused on the legislative intent
and purpose of the ESA, derived from both a careful reading of
other provisions in the statutory scheme325 and an extensive
discussion of the legislative history of the ESA and its subse-
quent amendments,32 6 rather than on the ordinary usage of
the terms "take" and "harm."
2. Identifying the Relevant Audience
Justice Stevens's discussion of the legislative history is
critical to understanding the audience dynamics at work in
Sweet Home. As Victoria Nourse has explained, the interpre-
tive question at issue was much more clearcut after the statute
was amended in 1982, for fairly strong evidence suggested that
Congress had effectively "hardwired" the Secretary's definition
of "harm" by way of its 1982 amendments.32 7 Indeed, although
Justice Stevens did not focus on the legislative history of those
amendments to the ESA, it did not go unnoticed in his opinion
that these amendments indicated congressional support for
the agency's definition of harm.3 2 8
Nevertheless, what was overlooked was that the 1982
amendments to the statute also introduced a new and distinct
audience: applicants seeking permits to be exempted from the
take prohibition which, by 1982, clearly included habitat deg-
radation, if "such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose
324 Id. at 704 n. 18 (majority opinion).
325 Id. at 702-04.
326 Id. at 704-08.
327 Victoria F. Nourse, Decision Theory and Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Skepticism
About Norms, Discretion, and the Virtues of Purposivism, 57 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 909,
917 (2013).
328 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 ("[The Committee Reports] make clear that
Congress intended 'take' to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful
actions.").
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of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."3 29 Con-
gress amended the ESA in recognition of the fact that the Sec-
retary's broad interpretation of harm had resulted in a
substantial number of everyday activities that could inadver-
tently result in an incidental "taking" by harming endangered
species through the transformation and destruction of critical
breeding and migratory habitats.3 30 Potential applications of
the broad regulatory interpretation had "provoked great con-
cern among property owners, developers, and state and local
government officials" prior to the 1982 amendment.3 3 ' The
statute was thus directed not only at activities of the public at
large, but also at landowners whose property development
would constitute incidental takings prohibited under the stat-
ute absent permit exemptions granted by the Secretary.
The plaintiffs in Sweet Home were thus not the simple
farmer depicted by Justice Scalia, but landowners, logging
companies, and timber workers who had been aware of the
regulation for nearly two decades.332 Had the plaintiffs actu-
ally sought a permit and been denied one, then on an as-
applied basis, concerns might have arisen about how the
agency had construed the reach of the statutory provision in
those particular circumstances. But that was not the case in
Sweet Home, which raised a facial challenge to the regulatory
definition altogether.3 3 3 As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
noted in her concurrence, the agency's interpretation of the
regulation as requiring that an incidental taking result in ac-
tual and foreseeable harm all but ensured that the ordinary
farmer's everyday activities would not be covered by the
regulation.334
329 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012).
330 Doug Williams, A Harder "Hard Case," 57 ST. LOUis U. L.J. 931, 951 (2013).
331 Id. at 953.
332 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 n. 18.
333 The procedural history on this question is a bit unclear, as the agency did
not raise the issue of the facial challenge prior to its petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Below, the district court summarized only that the Fish and
Wildlife Service had "placed restrictions on timber harvesting." Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 282 (D.D.C. 1992),
affd sub. nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
However, at no stage in the litigation did the plaintiffs contend either that they
had been threatened with a civil or criminal penalty for logging conduct or that
they had submitted a conservation plan and sought a permit from the harm
prohibition and had been denied one by the agency.
334 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708-09, 713 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Thus, the proper question in Sweet Home was not whether
the statutory definition had failed to give unsuspecting farmers
notice; as of 1995, the year the case was decided, there had
been few reported efforts to pursue criminal or civil penalties
for violations of the rule in question.3 3 5 Rather, the pertinent
question was whether the agency's refusal to allow a landowner
permission to alter or transform his land was so categorically
beyond the reach of the statute as to render the agency's inter-
pretation of harm altogether unreasonable. Viewed in this
light, Justice Stevens's invocation of Chevron deference to the
agency becomes more justifiable, and in that context, Justice
Scalia's concern about effective statutory notice for ordinary
farmer audiences seems misplaced, however legitimate that
concern may be for other statutory applications, including
other potential applications of the ESA. (As I will discuss in
subpart IV.B, such interpretive confusion may be avoided by
more carefully separating transitive and intransitive statutory
instructions.)
C. Misstating the Audience
How the concept of notice operates in statutory interpreta-
tion cases also seems to depend in part on whom a court per-
ceives to be the relevant audience of a given statute. This may
sometimes explain why courts emphasize one interpretive
method in a statute directed at one audience, only to empha-
size another source or method when interpreting an almost
identical statute directed at a different audience. If a judicial
interpreter takes audience considerations seriously, a method-
ological departure from one statute to another may very well be
acceptable; indeed, this approach can enhance rule-of-law
norms by tailoring interpretive methods appropriate to the
statutory audience.
However, Arlington Central School District Board of Educa-
tion v. Murphy3 3 6 demonstrates the care courts must take when
considering questions of statutory audience. In Murphy,3 37 the
Court was asked to determine whether the IDEA's attorney's
fee-shifting provision included awards for expert witness
fees,3 3 8 a question similar to the fee-shifting question
presented in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
335 See Williams, supra note 330, at 968.
336 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006).
337 Id. at 294-95.
338 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012).
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Casey.3 39 Murphy exemplifies an instance in which at least
some members of the Court explicitly addressed the interpre-
tive concerns faced by a first-order statutory audience. Yet the
majority almost surely misconstrued the nature of that audi-
ence, and therefore the basis on which to determine whether
the statutory text provided adequate notice. (See Table 1,
supra subpart II.A on page 163, identifying the distinct audi-
ences of the IDEA.) Murphy thus demonstrates why the choice
of which first-order audience to prioritize can often be disposi-
tive to the outcome of the decision, and why statutory interpre-
tation theory must take questions of statutory audience more
seriously.
Statutory audience seems to help explain the contrasting
outcomes of Casey and Murphy. In Casey, although Justice
Scalia looked primarily at "[tihe record of statutory usage" of
fee-shifting provisions across multiple sections of the U.S.
Code, in dicta he also pointed to the contrasting evidence in the
legislative histories of § 1988 and the IDEA to conclude that
while Congress expressly intended for the IDEA to include ex-
pert witness fees, it did not state as much with respect to
§ 1988.340 Justice Scalia highlighted a joint explanatory state-
ment of the Committee of the House and Senate Conference
indicating that "Itihe conferees intend that the term 'attorneys'
fees as part of the costs' include reasonable xpenses and fees
of expert witnesses."34 1 Legislative history rarely so directly
answers an interpretive question, and Justice Scalia reasoned
that this statement supported the Court's conclusion that
§ 1988's fee-shifting provision excluded expert witness fees be-
cause "[tihe specification [in the legislative history of the IDEA]
would have been quite unnecessary if the ordinary meaning of
the term included those elements. The statement is an appar-
ent effort to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term
of art" as used in § 1988.342
Given Justice Scalia's dicta in Casey, a lower court might
reasonably conclude that the IDEA's fee-shifting provision in-
cluded expert witness fees, and several lower courts did, in-
cluding in Murphy.3 43 Yet when Murphy came before the Court,
a majority diminished the importance of the legislative his-
339 499 U.S. 83, 84 (1991). For further discussion on Casey, see supra sub-
part II.E.
340 Casey, 499 U.S. at 88-92.
341 Id. at 91-92 n.5 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)).
342 Id.
343 See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332,
336-37 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (discussing dicta in Casey).
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tory,3 44 largely on the basis of the statute's audience. Notwith-
standing his own dicta in Casey, moreover, Justice Scalia
joined the majority in holding that the IDEA did not permit
expert witness fees to be included in shifted attorneys' fees as
part of costs.3 4 5 In a dissent joined by two others, Justice
Breyer largely emphasized the same legislative history Justice
Scalia had cited in Casey, recognizing that "[mlembers of both
Houses of Congress voted to adopt both the statutory text
before us and the Conference Report that made clear that the
statute's words include the expert costs here in question." 6 In
this sense, Justice Breyer framed one relevant audience as the
members of Congress who seemed to be assured they were
voting on amendments that would include expert witness fees
as part of costs.
First-order audience may partially explain the departure,
but it also reveals the importance of being attentive about
which first-order statutory audience to prioritize, as well as the
interpretive implications that might be drawn from this choice
of audience. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito pos-
ited that the IDEA's primary statutory audience was state edu-
cation officials who had to decide whether to accept federal
IDEA grants.3 4 7 Because Congress had enacted the IDEA
under its Spending Clause power,348 the majority framed the
question not as one of legislative purpose, but as one of clear
notice to the relevant statutory audience:
[Wie must view the IDEA from the perspective of a state offt-
cial who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the
State should accept IDEA funds and the obligations that go
with those funds. We must ask whether such a state official
would clearly understand that one of the obligations of the
Act is the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for
expert fees.3 4 9
Interpreting the statute from the standpoint of the state official,
the majority concluded that the legislative history (however
344 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304
(2006).
345 Id. at 293-94.
346 Id. at 313 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
347 Id. at 296 (majority opinion).
348 The majority noted that the Court had previously imposed a "clear notice"
rule for statutes passed under Congress's Spending Clause power when the provi-
sion in question attaches conditions on the states in exchange for accepting
federal funds. Id. at 295-96 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
349 Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
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clear itself) was insufficient "to provide the clear notice required
under the Spending Clause."3 5 0
Statutory audience, then, would seem to help explain the
disjuncture between Casey and Murphy. In Casey, the Court
seemed to focus on how judges routinely encounter attorney's
fees provisions, and it drew on the whole code canon as well as
legislative history to prioritize consistency in meaning across
statutes. In Murphy, by contrast, the Court dismissed that
same legislative history suggesting clear congressional intent
in favor of a clear notice rule for the IDEA's primary audience of
state and local officials.
Murphy also demonstrates the importance of taking care
when interrogating questions of notice and statutory audience.
The majority justified its imposition of a textual "clear notice"
requirement because Congress enacted the IDEA under its
Spending Clause power. Yet as Justice Ginsburg recognized in
her concurrence, the IDEA was also enacted pursuant to Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for which the Court does
not presume such a "clear notice" rule of interpretation.3 5 1 The
Spending Clause invocation alone, then, could not justify the
departure in interpretive method from the same legislative his-
tory relied upon in Casey.
Further, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the concept of
notice, regardless of the enumerated power Congress used to
pass legislation, must be carefully considered. She argued that
the Court's judicially imposed "'clear notice' requirement
should not be unmoored from its context."3 52 Unlike, for exam-
ple, a past case that considered "an unexpected condition for
compliance-a new [programmatic] obligation for participating
States," the Justice noted that "[tihe controversy here is lower
key."3 5 3 It concerned "not the educational programs IDEA di-
rects school districts to provide, but 'the remedies available
against a noncomplying [district]'" 354-in other words, a sub-
sidiary issue is unlikely to be dispositive in deciding whether to
accept hundreds of millions of dollars a year in federal
funding.3 5 5
350 Id. at 303.
351 Id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
352 Id.
353 Id. (alteration in original).
354 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
355 KYRIE E. DRAGOO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44624, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILmES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) FUNDING: A PRIMER 17-18 tbl.2 (2018).
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A further complication is that it is far from clear that the
majority correctly identified the first-order statutory audience
likely to engage directly with the IDEA's statutory requirements
when deciding whether to accept federal funds. The majority's
posited state education official was rather underspecified. For
a statute as wide-reaching as the IDEA, audiences that engage
generally with the IDEA could vary from state education agen-
cies that regularly interact directly with the U.S. Department of
Education over IDEA compliance, to local school boards, to
individual school officials who sometimes apply for personnel
grants themselves. The majority did not take care to specify
which of these audiences it had in mind, nor provide any em-
pirical basis for what that audience might have known, or be
able to learn, about the IDEA's requirements.
In actuality, the majority perhaps underestimated the
knowledge and sophistication of the most plausible audience:
state officials who engage directly with the Department of Edu-
cation in understanding the IDEA's requirements and deciding
whether to accept conditional federal funds. Local educators
are not the state officials directly involved in the states' decision
to consent to IDEA requirements; rather, since at least 1970,
the IDEA has mandated that states establish advisory councils
that advise both local officials and state education agencies as
to requirements under the IDEA.3 56 Moreover, the Department
of Education has long allocated recurring annual IDEA formula
grants to every state in order to support special education and
related services,3 5 7 and these grants are awarded on the basis
of mechanical calculations about each state's relative popula-
tion of children with disabilities.3 5 8 Acceptance of these an-
nual awards is conditional on IDEA compliance, which means
every state had continually consented every year to the IDEA's
requirements well before the dispute that arose in Murphy.
Given all this, the majority's posited concern about audience
notice seemed to touch on only a small fragment of the complex
compliance notice issues at stake.3 59
356 Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 131(a)(1), 84 Stat. 121, 135 (1970) (repealed 1978);
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
357 U.S. Dep't of Ed., State Formula Grants, IDEA, https://sites.ed.gov/idea/
state-formula-grants/ [https://perma.cc/HB4B-ZB5Q] (last visited June 4,
2019).
358 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(d)(A) (2012).
359 As the respondents in Murphy emphasized, the IDEA fee-shifting provision
had been the law for twenty years, and no prior state litigant had made the
Spending Clause argument about defective notice: "courts overwhelmingly inter-
preted [the provision] as imposing an obligation on school boards to pay parents
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Moreover, recall that state officials were not the only im-
portant audience of the statute. One might equally wonder
whether the parents in Murphy had reason to believe they
would be reimbursed for the nearly $30,000 they spent to ob-
tain the expert assessment necessary to vindicate their child's
special education needs. After all, the IDEA guarantees an
appropriate education at no cost to the parents, something Jus-
tice Breyer emphasized in his dissent.3 6 0 If so, then the
Murphys might reasonably have felt the IDEA gave clear notice
that they would not be responsible for any fees associated with
vindicating their child's needs. An explicit debate about the
relevant statutory audience to prioritize, how that audience
was likely to encounter the statute's requirements, and the
circumstances under which a clear notice presumption should
trump clarifying legislative history, would have helped to ex-
plain the conflicting interpretive approaches in Murphy and
Casey.36 1
In the absence of such analysis, the majority's disinclina-
tion to credit the legislative history is perhaps better justified
with respect to the relevant audience of the provision in ques-
tion: judges.
TABLE 9: PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE OF IDEA FEE-SHIFIING PROVISION
Audience Relevant Relevant Statutory Text
Provision
Federal Judges 20 U.S.C. "[The court, in its discretion, may award
(as first-order § 1415(h)(i)(3)(B) reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the
audience) costs .. . to a prevailing party who is the
parent of a child with a disability."
As discussed above in subpart II.E, requiring consistency
in the meaning of statutory terms seems to be especially impor-
tant for provisions directed at judicial audiences. This would
appear to help clarify the standpoint from which Justice Gins-
burg approached the statute in her concurrence. Citing the
default rule for interpreting attorneys' fee-shifting provisions,
their costs." Brief of Respondents at 48-49, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (No. 05-18), 2006 WL 838890, at *48-49.
360 Murphy, 548 U.S. at 313 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the IDEA
guarantees appropriate special education "at no cost to parents").
361 For example, administrative law scholar Peter Strauss has suggested the
probable audience of the IDEA was the "affected public-particularly those well-
advised by lawyers" who would have known about the legislative history and the
IDEA's inclusion of expert witness fees in shifting the fees and costs of litigation.
Peter Strauss, Judging Statutes, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 447-48 (2015) (reviewing
ROBERT A. KATzMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
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Justice Ginsburg observed that whatever Congress's intended
meaning, "Congress did not compose [the fee-shifting provi-
sion's] text, as it did the texts of other statutes too numerous
and varied to ignore, to alter the common import of the terms
'attorneys' fees' and 'costs' in the context of expense-allocation
legislation."3 6 2 On this basis, Justice Ginsburg was disinclined
to "rewrite" the statutory text actually passed by Congress, and
she concluded that the ball was "properly left in Congress'
court to provide" the appropriately articulated provision.363
Viewing fee-shifting statutes as being addressed to judges,
rather than to the audiences that those provisions seek to ben-
efit or regulate, may best justify why courts have repeatedly
applied methods of interpretation uncommonly relied upon in
most other interpretive disputes.
IV
CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections, I have sought to show why con-
siderations of statutory audience are essential for any compre-
hensive theory of statutory interpretation. Statutes seek to
alter the behavior of very different audiences in quite distinc-
tive ways. Judicial rules for interpretation will necessarily af-
fect how various statutory audiences are expected to conform
their behavior to statutes, yet not all methods and sources of
interpretation may be equally suitable for all statutes and all
statutory audiences. Failure to recognize this dynamic may
risk undermining not only judicially developed substantive ca-
nons that are themselves at least partially audience-moti-
vated-such as the rule of lenity, the clear notice rule, and
administrative deference-but also rule-of-law values like no-
tice, judicial deference, and consent. Being attentive to the
distinctive conditions and considerations for different statutory
audience interpreters clarifies the normative and jurispruden-
tial stakes of statutory interpretation. Of course, divergent
views about statutory audience do not fully explain the dis-
agreements in the canonical statutory interpretation cases I
have revisited. Nevertheless, raising questions about statutory
audience and nonjudicial interpretation does shed light on core
tensions in theories of statutory interpretation methodology.
362 Murphy, 548 U.S. at 306-07 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
363 Id. at 307.
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In this section, I consider several lessons that the examina-
tion of statutory audience may yield for statutory interpretation
theory.
A. Prioritizing Audience-Appropriate Interpretative
Methods
As the preceding sections have shown, audience norms,
substantive legal canons, and interpretive methods are (and
should be treated as) inextricably related. Despite this, judges
often disregard the relationship between norms, substantive
canons, and interpretive methodology. Often, the methods
chosen tend to undermine the very audience norms judges
seek to enforce. This is especially true when judges seek to
ensure that adequate notice is provided for statutes directed at
the public at large, or when judges are tasked with interpreting
statutes delegating enforcement and lawmaking authority to
administrative agency audiences.
1. The Relationship Between Audience and "Ordinary"
Meaning
-When invoking audience notice canons like the rule of lenity,
courts should clarify what is meant by "ordinary" meaning,
how that meaning can be identified, and for which audience
the chosen meaning might be considered "ordinary."
Audience notice is not only a critical rule-of-law norm, but
it is also a chief justification for the rule of lenity. Yet as this
Article has reviewed, courts are often maddeningly imprecise in
making claims about the "ordinary" meaning of statutory terms
that are supposed to put the general public on fair notice. If
the lenity rule is invoked because the statutory audience is
laypeople to whom the statute must give adequate notice, then
interpretive methods should be prioritized only to the degree
they tend to enhance the statute's capacity to provide fair no-
tice to its relevant audiences.
In such circumstances, a judge might reasonably hesitate
before relying on the whole code or whole act canons, special-
ized technical definitions, or legislative history, methods likely
to make a statutory law less accessible to the lay audiences
whose behavior it was enacted to govern. Reliance on those
methods cannot help but risk weakening due process and fair
notice, while also undermining the normative force of interpre-
tive canons like the rule of lenity or the reasonable mistake of
law defense. Of course, legal moralism should be considered as
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well: for statutes whose prohibitions cover obviously immoral
conduct, textual notice may be of diminished relevance.
Judges should also strive to be clearer about the precise
threshold of ambiguity sufficient for the rule of lenity to apply.
Courts should expressly address whether they think the mean-
ing that should be sought is the relevant word or phrase's
prototypical meaning, its most common meaning, or merely a
frequent or permissible meaning. They should also develop a
more principled basis for selecting from among evidence of or-
dinary usage and semantic meaning. For example, courts
should be explicit about whether contemporary or enacting-era
dictionaries are more appropriate, as well as their reasons for
concluding that one dictionary's definition better reflects ordi-
nary usage than another's. Dictionaries, after all, are them-
selves hardly neutral sources of meaning.36 4
In addition, with careful refinement over time, the thought-
ful use of corpus linguistics may sometimes enhance inquiries
into ordinary usage of phrases, because sophisticated analysis
of large databases of ordinary usage may be less prone to
cherry-picking and be better able to capture the ordinary
meaning of English words used in phrases rather than as iso-
lated words-provided those databases are themselves reflec-
tive of sources of relevant usage, and readily accessible.
As Muscarello demonstrated, and judges like Justice Kava-
naugh have criticized,3 65 the extent of textual ambiguity seems
to emerge or recede depending on which sources a court
chooses to prioritize and which sources it chooses to ignore.
When this is so, there is no principled basis for deciding
whether sufficient ambiguity exists such that the rule of lenity
should be invoked, or whether it is appropriate to move to Step
Two of the Chevron deference inquiry. Of course, the lack of
such a principle undermines both the force of these substan-
tive doctrines as well as the rule of law itself, for first-order
statutory audiences cannot predict when they apply either.
2. Regulatory Statutes and Administrative Deference
-When interpreting administrative statutes, courts should
identify whether the provision in question is an intransitive
decision rule or a transitive conduct rule. If the former, textual
notice and ordinary usage should be of diminished concern; f
the latter, courts should prioritize evidence of meaning appro-
priate for the statute's non-official regulated audiences.
364 See Wallace, supra note 128.
365 See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2118.
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It should by now be clear that the interpretive dynamics for
intransitive statutes directed at administrative agency audi-
ences can be quite different from transitive statutes that apply
directly to lay audiences. This is true regardless of whether
formal administrative deference regimes like Chevron apply to
the statute in question. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to
treat intransitive statutory provisions that delegate rulemaking
to an administrative agency as communicating to that audi-
ence in a manner very differently from transitive statutes di-
rected at the public at large.
For this reason, where an ambiguous statutory term or
phrase is part of an intransitive delegation to an agency, the
plain meaning rule and evidence of ordinary usage may be of
limited value in precisifying the statute's meaning. This is es-
pecially so where the statute in question calls for the regulation
of sophisticated audiences like corporations, industry profes-
sionals, or interest groups, for which more complex and con-
textual methods of interpretation may be perfectly appropriate.
Some judicial approaches to the interpretation of federal
statutes have made strides in this direction, but could still be
enhanced from the standpoint of audience norms. The Seventh
Circuit, for example, has long had a policy of relying primarily
on the semantic content of the statute in its approach to inter-
preting an administrative statute at Chevron Step One; only
once the statute is determined to be sufficiently ambiguous on
the basis of semantic content alone will the Circuit draw on the
statute's contextual content (such as the legislative history) in
assessing the reasonableness of the agency's asserted meaning
at Step Two. 3 6 6 While such an approach rightly reflects the
comparatively weaker arguments for textualist methods where
the legislative delegation plainly exists within the "Chevron
space" of agency policy-making choice, this interpretive ap-
proach could be even more nuanced. After all, the benefit of
focusing on semantic content and evidence of ordinary usage in
Chevron Step One will depend in large part on whether the
statutory provision also has direct transitive application to
other audiences, as with the ESA's take prohibition in Sweet
Home, or only to more sophisticated institutional entities, as
with the FACA provision in Public Citizen.
A related takeaway is that fair notice concerns may often
be less relevant for administrative authorizing statutes and
more relevant for the rules and regulations promulgated under




them. Where this is so, the Auer/Kisor deference3 67 that courts
sometimes accord administrative agencies when interpreting
agencies' own ambiguous rules and regulations may be of
questionable merit, especially where those regulations serve as
the notice document for the regulated audiences of the under-
lying statutes. Assessing these regulations from the stand-
point of audience might provide an alternate basis for
skepticism of Auer deference, at least when the first-order au-
dience of the regulation is likely to be the public at large and
the regulation serves as the effective notice document. I hope
to explore this question, and the role of regulatory notice more
generally, in future work.
3. Attend to the Statutorily Designated Role of
Interpretive Intermediaries
-What conduct the statutes covers, and whose behavior the
statute seeks to alter, can often be understood by how the
statute conscripts third-party intermediaries as influential
interpreters.
Statutory interpretation is often treated as an exercise in
the application of interpretive tools to a particular line of text.
Yet outside of the courtroom, many statutes are implemented,
enforced, and interpreted by a range of third parties who are
conscripted by the statute to enhance compliance by the
targeted audiences. This context is often critical for under-
standing what the statutory provision means, to whom it is
addressed, and how legislative drafters anticipate the target
audience(s) will get the message.
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act relies on auditors to
communicate statutory requirements to corporate officers and
financial professionals through training certifications and com-
pliance schemes. This compliance regime clarifies how the
statute ensures that regulated audiences are aware of their
reporting and record-keeping responsibilities in a word, how
the audience "gets the message." And it also suggests that the
fisherman's off-shore catch at question in Yates was not the
fraudulent conduct the statute sought to prohibit. The role of
third-party interpreters also helps to explain the differential
application of mistake-of-law rules in general criminal versus
criminal tax contexts, for courts seem to deem it reasonable for
taxpayers to rely on the interpretive advice of certified tax
367 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997).
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preparers and advisors, but not for individuals seeking clarifi-
cation as to the criminal consequences of other kinds of
conduct.
Given this, courts should be more attentive to the statute's
envisioned role for third-party intermediaries when seeking to
understand both what the statute means and to whom it
applies.
B. Drafting Single Statutory Provisions That Address
Multiple Audiences
-Legislative (and regulatory) drafters should avoid drafting
provisions that direct different audiences to take different ac-
tions by way of the same legal text.
The possibility of distinct and competing audiences for ad-
ministrative statutes raises a related lesson for statutory (and
regulatory) drafters. Whenever possible, legal rules should be
drafted so as to avoid communicating in multiple registers to
two (or more) audiences at once. The interpretive confusion in
Sweet Home arose because the ESA provision in question con-
tained both (i) a direct, transitive criminal conduct rule for
ordinary individuals (i.e., "don't take endangered species") as
well as (ii) an indirect, intransitive administrative delegation to
the agency to promulgate rules furthering protections for such
species (i.e., "prevent the harm to, and therefore the taking of
endangered species").
When the same statutory provision serves as the basis
both for a potential criminal indictment for a member of the
general public and for administrative notice-and-comment
rulemaking related to a complex permitting scheme regulating
large-scale land development, confusion and disagreement
over which audience to focus on-and therefore which inter-
pretive methods to prioritize-are especially likely to arise. The
ESA provision in question is no drafter's idealized conception of
a model statute.
C. Reconsidering Textualism and Purposivism
-Considerations of Audience Suggest Possibilities for Prag-
matic Compromise between Textualism and Purposivism and
Highlight the Pragmatic Utility of Each Approach to
Interpretation.
Examining statutory interpretation methodology in light of
statutory audience may also have the effect of reconciling as-
pects of the disagreements between textualists and
2232019]1
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purposivists. A focus on statutory audience in interpretation
might provide those not fully wedded to either approach with a
more flexible yet principled method of selecting between the
interpretive methods advocated for under either theory on the
basis of the relevant audience of the statutory provision in
question. Among textualism's most appealing features is its
emphasis on a common-sense approach to interpretation and
its provision of tools of interpretation readily available to lay
audiences.3 6 8 Purposivism, by contrast, rightly identifies that
for the interpretation of statutes whose texts do not communi-
cate sufficient information to provide specific conduct rules,
limiting interpretive sources to a term's semantic content may
be inapt, in light of the broader statutory ambit, context, and
enactment history as well as the inherent limitations of stat-
utes as a form of communicative speech. An audience-oriented
approach to statutory interpretation provides a fresh basis to
consider each approach's merits and weaknesses, while pro-
viding some guiding ex ante principles for the selection of
methods in close cases, an approach that at least some judges
apparently continue to seek.3 6 9
While this Article has set out a somewhat stylized concep-
tual framework for important questions about statutory audi-
ence, knowledge about first-order audience understanding and
application of law is uneven, and much work remains to en-
hance our understanding of how nonjudicial audiences engage
with statutes and regulations. This will assist in continuing to
contribute to making statutory interpretation more consistent,
principled, and systematic. That research might include sur-
veying members of the public to discover folk understandings
of legal terms and concepts, or providing a case study on how
regulators and compliance officers cooperate to develop regula-
tory compliance regimes.3 7 0 A few scholars in the emerging
field of experimental jurisprudence have recently begun to con-
duct such undertakings, examining approaches that ordinary
individuals take when interpreting or identifying common legal
terms and concepts.3 7 1
368 See Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 174.
369 See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2121.
370 Nick Parrillo's recent empirical examination of the federal agency guidance
process is an especially instructive example. See PARRILLO, supra note 223.
371 See, e.g., Farnsworth et al., supra note 145 (presenting experimental re-
search suggesting readers of statutes are more likely to identify statutory ambigu-
ity when asked to give their own interpretation of the statute rather than that of
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This Article provides an initial conceptual framework to
ground a larger investigation into how statutes are interpreted
and implemented outside of courts. Such work will provide a
better understanding of the ways that first-order audiences
give meaning to law, and how regulated audiences rely on stat-
utory and regulatory texts, tools of interpretation, and the ad-
vice of influential intermediaries and official interpreters in
complying with statutory mandates. Having put forward a the-
ory of statutory audience and first-order statutory interpreta-
tion, future work calls for shedding greater light on how these
interpretative actions work in practice.
an ordinary reader of English); Macleod, supra note 144 (presenting experimental
research data suggesting that the "ordinary meaning" that courts sometimes at-
tribute to common causal phrases included in jury instructions are not the mean-
ings lay audiences understand those terms to convey); Roseanna Sommers,
Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author)
(presenting experimental research data suggesting lay audiences understand the
concept of consent differently than do judges and scholars).
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